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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Judge. 
 
This is an extremely complicated motor vehicle dealer 
franchise termination case marked by disputes over what is 
known in the industry as "dualing," i.e., the acquisition by 
an automobile franchisee of a franchise of a different 
manufacturer. This case comes before us on appeal from a 
series of orders entered by the District Court for the District 
of New Jersey in a declaratory judgment action arising out 
of a franchise termination. The plaintiff is General Motors 
Corporation, Chevrolet Motor Division (GM), the franchisor. 
In 1998, GM notified the defendant, New AC Chevrolet, Inc. 
(New AC), a dealer in Jersey City, New Jersey, that its 
franchise agreement would be terminated. As the basis for 
its termination decision, GM pointed to New AC's insistence 
on adding a "dualed" Volkswagen franchise to its dealership 
business despite GM's repeated objections to such an 
addition. 
 
In its suit, GM sought a declaration that the proposed 
termination was in compliance with the parties' dealer 
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agreement, which forbade the addition of other vehicle lines 
without GM's prior written authorization; the federal 
Automobile Dealers Day in Court Act (ADDCA), 15 U.S.C. 
SS 1221-25; and New Jersey's Franchise Practices Act 
(NJFPA), N.J. Stat. Ann. SS 56:10-1 to 56:10-15. In its 
response, New AC asserted that the planned termination 
was actually part of GM's predetermined design to remove 
New AC as a Chevrolet franchisee, and to have another 
dealer serve as its exclusive Chevrolet distributor in Jersey 
City. Consequently, New AC filed a counterclaim, alleging 
essentially that GM's decision to terminate New AC's 
franchise, as well certain other of its actions toward New 
AC, ran afoul of the expressed and implied terms of the 
franchise agreement, the ADDCA, and the NJFPA. 
 
Although New AC's appeal takes issue with the entire 
series of orders entered by the District Court during the 
two-year course of this litigation, New AC's most significant 
challenges are made in connection with two orders--the 
January 13, 1999 order dismissing inter alia Counts One 
and Four of New AC's counterclaim on Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 
12(b)(6) grounds, and the March 8, 2000 order granting 
summary judgment in GM's favor on the ADDCA, NJFPA, 
and state contract law claims, see General Motors Corp. v. 
New A.C. Chevrolet, Inc., 91 F. Supp. 2d 733 (D.N.J. 2000). 
We first take up New AC's challenge to the March 8, 2000 
summary judgment order, for the issues raised in 
connection with this challenge bear directly on the core of 
the dispute between GM and New AC, and require us to 
examine the nature of the relationship between an 
automobile franchisor and franchisee. In pertinent part, the 
March 8, 2000 order determined: (1) that there was no 
genuine issue that New AC committed a material breach of 
the franchise agreement by insisting on the operation of a 
Volkswagen vehicle line on its dealership premises; and (2) 
that GM possessed the "good cause" necessary for a lawful 
franchise termination under S 56:10-5 of the NJFPA. See id. 
at 738-39, 740-41. 
 
With respect to New AC's challenges to the March 8, 
2000 order, we first reject New AC's contention, stressed at 
oral argument, that its addition of a Volkswagen line did 
not constitute a breach of its franchise agreement with GM 
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because Volkswagen sales and service were offered at a 
separate dealership location and facility. We do not think 
the facts of this case support such a contention. We further 
conclude that there is no genuine issue as to the 
materiality of this breach. A breach is material if it will 
deprive the injured party of the benefit that is justifiably 
expected under the contract, and, in this case, GM's 
justifiable expectation is best evidenced by the mutually 
agreed upon provisions of the dealer agreement that 
proscribe New AC from offering a "dualed" vehicle line 
without GM's prior written authorization. 
 
The most significant challenge that New AC raises in 
connection with its appeal of the March 8, 2000 summary 
judgment order, a contention also heavily emphasized at 
oral argument, concerns S 56:10-5 of the NJFPA. As noted 
above, this statutory provision supplements all private 
franchise agreements in New Jersey by directing that 
termination occur only if the franchisor possesses"good 
cause." N.J. Stat. Ann. S 56:10-5. It defines "good cause" as 
"failure by the franchisee to substantially comply with those 
requirements imposed upon him by the franchise." Id. 
Although S 56:10-5, by its terms, appears to define "good 
cause" only by reference to the actions of the franchisee, 
New AC argues that the franchisor must also act in good 
faith in order to possess the "good cause" necessary for 
termination under S 56:10-5. Because the District Court, in 
its March 8, 2000 opinion, took the (contrary) position that 
a franchisor's good faith was irrelevant to the"good cause" 
inquiry, see General Motors Corp., 91 F. Supp. 2d at 740 
n.10, New AC submits that the Court's decision should be 
reversed. 
 
We assume arguendo, as New AC would like us to do, 
that under New Jersey franchise law, a franchisor's 
motivation in effecting a franchisee's termination is relevant 
to the "good cause" inquiry. Put another way, we assume 
that a franchisor will not possess the "good cause" required 
for termination by S 56:10-5 unless it also makes that 
decision in good faith. Nonetheless, we conclude that New 
AC has failed to furnish the record evidence necessary to 
create a genuine issue that GM acted in bad faith (or with 
an improper motive) in terminating New AC's Chevrolet 
franchise. 
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New AC's argument for GM's bad faith centers primarily 
on what we will call the "Project 2000" or"Plan 2000" 
theory; the central aspect of this theory is the contention 
that GM's decision to terminate New AC, ostensibly for its 
"dualing" of a Volkswagen line, was part of its 
predetermined decision to strip New AC of its Chevrolet 
franchise, and to have another dealer serve as GM's 
exclusive Chevrolet franchisee in Jersey City. Examining 
the record evidence put forth by New AC in support of the 
"Project 2000" theory, we do not think it suffices to create 
a genuine issue as to GM's bad-faith motivation. Because 
we conclude that New AC's "dualing" of a Volkswagen 
franchise constituted a material breach of its dealer 
agreement (and represented substantial noncompliance 
with its franchise obligations), and because we find that 
New AC failed to create a genuine issue as to GM's bad 
faith, we will affirm the District Court's March 8, 2000 
order in all respects. 
 
We then turn to New AC's challenges to the January 13, 
1999 dismissal order, which primarily require us to 
construe the allegations that New AC set forth in its 
counterclaim. Here, New AC's first objection is to the 
District Court's dismissal of Count One of its counterclaim, 
which alleges that GM violated the provisions of the 
ADDCA. The ADDCA is a federal remedial statute, enacted 
to redress the bargaining disparity between large 
automobile manufacturers and local dealerships. The 
ADDCA generally requires a manufacturer to act in"good 
faith" in its relations with its dealers, see  15 U.S.C. S 1222, 
and defines "good faith" narrowly as precluding "coercion, 
intimidation, or threats of coercion or intimidation," id. at 
S 1221(e). 
 
In reviewing the District Court's Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(6) 
dismissal of New AC's ADDCA counterclaim, we begin by 
clarifying the type of automobile manufacturer conduct that 
constitutes coercion or intimidation. We have previously 
stated that the type of coercion or intimidation rendered 
actionable by the ADDCA occurs only when the 
manufacturer makes a "wrongful demand which will result 
in sanction if not complied with." Buono Sales, Inc. v. 
Chrysler Motors Corp., 449 F.2d 715, 724 (3d Cir. 1971) 
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(internal quotations and citations omitted). We now explain 
that while a manufacturer does not make a wrongful 
demand if it merely insists that the dealer comply with a 
reasonable obligation imposed by the franchise agreement, 
a dealer can state a claim for relief under the ADDCA by 
alleging that the manufacturer's reliance on those 
objectively reasonable provisions is, in fact, motivated by a 
pretextual, bad-faith reason. 
 
Applying this standard to the facts as alleged in New AC's 
counterclaim, we conclude that New AC adequately stated 
a claim for relief under the ADDCA based on GM's approval 
of the relocation of a competing Chevrolet franchisee, and 
its decision to terminate New AC due to the latter's 
"dualing" of a Volkswagen line. However, we do not think 
that our conclusion necessitates setting aside the District 
Court's dismissal of Count One of New AC's counterclaim, 
as New AC was not prejudiced by the District Court's 
erroneous dismissal of these claims. New AC had a full and 
fair opportunity to discover and present evidence 
supporting these claims to the District Court, either 
because GM's declaratory judgment action presented a 
mirror image of the claim which remained alive in the 
litigation and was ultimately adjudicated by the District 
Court, or because the claim was inextricably linked to New 
AC's "Project 2000" theory of bad faith, with respect to 
which New AC's record evidence failed to create a genuine 
issue of material fact. 
 
New AC also contests the District Court's dismissal of 
Count Four of its counterclaim, which alleges inter alia that 
GM's actions violated the implied duty of good faith and fair 
dealing by predetermining the outcome of its management 
review process, and by approving the relocation of a 
competing Chevrolet franchisee. Examining the pertinent 
allegations made in New AC's counterclaim, we first 
conclude that New AC failed to make the factual allegations 
necessary to support a claim that such an implied duty was 
breached when GM predetermined the outcome of its 
management review process. We then turn to the more 
significant question of whether such a duty of good faith 
even arises under Michigan law--the state law that the 
parties agree is applicable to the resolution of this issue--in 
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connection with GM's decision to authorize the relocation of 
a competing Chevrolet franchisee. 
 
Under Michigan state contract law, "[w]here a party to a 
contract makes the manner of its performance a matter of 
its own discretion, the law does not hesitate to imply the 
proviso that such discretion be exercised honestly and in 
good faith." Burkhardt v. City Nat'l Bank of Detroit, 226 
N.W.2d 678, 680 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975). We conclude that 
the pertinent franchise agreement provision, which commits 
such a relocation decision to the sole discretion of GM, 
gives rise to an implied duty of good faith. Nonetheless, we 
believe that the District Court's decision to the contrary 
does not mandate reversal of the District Court's 12(b)(6) 
dismissal, as New AC had a full and fair opportunity to 
obtain and present evidence establishing GM's bad faith 
but failed to do so adequately. 
 
Aside from these principal issues, New AC brings a series 
of less significant challenges to the other orders entered by 
the District Court during the life span of this litigation. We 
resolve these issues summarily, with brief commentary, 
infra at note 25, and hold that none warrant reversal of any 
of the District Court's orders. We thus affirm the decision 




A. Factual Background 
 
New AC is a New Jersey corporation operating as an 
automobile dealer in Jersey City. GM is a Delaware 
corporation engaged in the manufacture and distribution of 
automobiles and automobile parts and accessories. 
Chevrolet is a division of GM. New AC commenced business 
as a Chevrolet franchisee in 1983. New AC's dealership was 
then, and continues to be today, located at 3085 Kennedy 
Boulevard in Jersey City. The present litigation is not the 
first between GM and New AC; the two companies earlier 
sparred over the relocation of a competing Chevrolet 
franchise, the DiFeo Chevrolet dealership (DiFeo). Because 
the events surrounding DiFeo's relocation are relevant to 
certain issues on this appeal, we set forth the key facts. 
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In 1992, New AC and Bell Chevrolet were the only two 
Chevrolet franchises located in Jersey City, and both had 
dealerships situated along Kennedy Boulevard. In 
November of 1992, DiFeo acquired Bell Chevrolet (one 
month later, DiFeo itself was acquired by United Auto 
Group, although it continued to operate under the DiFeo 
name), and moved the dealership to Clendenny Avenue. In 
1995, DiFeo sought to relocate its Chevrolet franchise yet 
again, this time to a location on Route 440 in Jersey City, 
and sought GM's permission for the move. Because Route 
440 was apparently a more commercially attractive site, GM 
approved the relocation, and informed New AC that the 
DiFeo franchise would be moving to a location on Route 
440. Concerned that DiFeo's relocation would damage its 
dealership business, New AC challenged the move both at 
the administrative level and before the Superior Court of 
New Jersey.1 New AC did not prevail, either in the 
administrative proceedings or in the Superior Court, see 
New A.C. Chevrolet, Inc. v. Chevrolet Div. of Gen. Motors 
Corp., 688 A.2d 116 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997), and 
DiFeo's 1995 relocation to the Route 440 site was allowed 
to proceed. 
 
We turn now to the facts of the present litigation. At all 
relevant times, the franchise relationship between GM and 
New AC was governed by a series of standardized Chevrolet 
"Dealer Sales and Service Agreements," which fix the rights 
and obligations of franchisor GM and franchisee New AC, 
and are renewable every five years. At the time of GM's 
termination decision, the operative "Dealer Sales and 
Service Agreement" was one that had become effective on 
November 1, 1995 (Dealer Agreement). The specific 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. New AC's challenge was brought pursuant to the New Jersey Motor 
Vehicle Franchise Act (NJMVFA), N.J. Stat. Ann.SS 56:10-16 to 56:10- 
25, which provides a protest procedure by which an existing automobile 
dealer can contest (and eventually enjoin) its franchisor's decision to 
relocate a new dealer into the same market area, by demonstrating that 
such a move would be "injurious" to the existing dealer and to the public 
interest. See id. SS 56:10-18, 56:10-19. Such a protest is heard, in the 
first instance, by the Motor Vehicle Franchise Committee, but the 
Committee's final determination can be appealed to the Superior Court 
of New Jersey. 
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provisions of the Dealer Agreement will be canvassed in 
more extensive fashion below, as they become pertinent to 
the analysis of this appeal. For present purposes, however, 
the most important provision is Article 4.4.2 of the Dealer 
Agreement, which requires the franchisee to obtain prior 
written permission from GM before altering the location or 
the use of its dealership premises, and identifies the 
addition of a different vehicle line as an alteration covered 
by this approval requirement: "No change in location or in 
the use of Premises, including addition of any other vehicle 
lines, will be made without Division's [i.e., GM's] prior 
written authorization." 
 
The events directly leading up to the present litigation 
commenced when New AC decided to supplement its then- 
existing dealership business by adding a Volkswagen line of 
vehicles. In late December 1995, New AC submitted 
applications for a franchise to Volkwagen of America, Inc. 
(Volkswagen). Volkswagen approved New AC's request, and 
on February 23, 1996, New AC signed a letter of intent with 
Volkswagen agreeing to serve as an authorized Volkswagen 
dealer in Jersey City. 
 
About five weeks after executing the letter of intent, New 
AC first informed GM, by letter, of its plans to operate a 
Volkswagen franchise as part of its dealership business. In 
response, GM requested that New AC supply further 
information concerning the planned Volkswagen franchise, 
and submit a proposed Location and Premises Addendum 
which would identify the space at New AC's Kennedy 
Boulevard dealership that would be allocated to GM uses 
and the space that would allocated to Volkswagen uses. 
Furthermore, GM specifically reminded New AC that Article 
4.4.2 of the Dealer Agreement governs New AC's ability to 
add new vehicle lines to its dealership business. 
 
New AC replied about two weeks later, maintaining that 
it planned to keep the physical space and personnel 
devoted to Volkswagen sales and servicing separate and 
distinct from the space and personnel responsible for GM 
sales and service. In addition, New AC provided the 
proposed Location and Premises Addendum. The proposed 
Addendum represented that the total space at the Kennedy 
Boulevard dealership then-assigned to GM use would be 
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decreased by 1,000 square feet, which would be re- 
allocated to Volkswagen use. After reviewing the materials 
furnished by New AC, GM denied New AC's request for the 
addition of a Volkswagen line of vehicles. By way of 
explanation, GM noted that its dealer strategy "generally 
disfavors dualing of GM lines with the vehicle lines of 
another manufacturer;" it also identified New AC's 
deficiencies as a dealer in four areas: capitalization, sales 
performance, customer satisfaction, and training, and 
stated GM's concern that the addition of a Volkswagen line 
would exacerbate these deficiencies. 
 
New AC reacted to this denial by asking for non-binding 
management review of the decision, in accordance with 
GM's internal grievance procedure, as detailed in the GM 
handbook entitled "Dispute Resolution Process for 
Chevrolet, Pontiac, Oldsmobile or GMC Truck Dealers." GM 
conducted the requested management review, but informed 
New AC that its denial of the Volkswagen line addition 
would stand. New AC then asked GM to reconsider and 
represented that it had improved the deficiencies in its 
capitalization, sales performance, customer satisfaction, 
and training that GM had earlier observed. Again, GM stood 
by its denial, stressing its general policy against"dualing of 
GM lines with those of another manufacturer." Again, GM 
pointed New AC to its obligations under Article 4.4.2 of the 
Dealer Agreement, stating: "[P]lease be reminded that any 
change to, or in the use of, a dealer's facility requires the 
prior written approval of the division." 
 
Despite GM's denials, New AC proceeded with its plans to 
add a Volkswagen line of vehicles at the Kennedy Boulevard 
dealership. GM officials learned that New AC had begun 
operating a Volkswagen franchise around January 1997. 
On January 15, 1997, Daniel Durkin, GM's Zone Manager 
for the area including Jersey City, wrote to New AC 
informing the franchisee that it was in material breach of 
the Dealer Agreement due to its "addition of the 
Volkswagen franchise without obtaining General Motors 
written approval," as required under Article 4.4.2 of the 
Dealer Agreement. Durkin warned New AC that "if this 
serious situation is not satisfactorily resolved or corrected 
within 30 days from your receipt of this letter, then 
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Chevrolet Motor Division may elect to terminate the Dealer 
Agreement and cease all business relationships with your 
dealer company." Durkin sent a second letter of warning to 
New AC about one month later, on February 11, 1997, 
stressing that "[t]he only rectification acceptable to 
Chevrolet is for The New A.C. Chevrolet to remove 
Volkswagen from the Chevrolet premises, which can be 
accomplished by providing completely separate sales and 
service facilities for Volkswagen." 
 
GM's interactions with New AC during this period were 
not, however, limited to the sending of warning letters. 
Around June of 1997, in an apparent attempt to arrive at 
a mutually satisfactory compromise avoiding the 
termination of New AC's Chevrolet dealership, Durkin 
suggested that New AC consider offering Oldsmobiles, 
manufactured by another GM division, as a second line of 
vehicles at the Kennedy Boulevard location. According to 
Durkin, the DiFeo dealership, the other Chevrolet 
franchisee operating in Jersey City, was in the process of 
relinquishing both its Chevrolet and Oldsmobile franchises. 
Durkin recommended that New AC explore the possibility of 
acquiring the soon-to-be relinquished Oldsmobile franchise, 
and indicated that GM would support the addition of 
Oldsmobile to New AC's dealership under the appropriate 
circumstances. Durkin mentioned that GM hoped for a 
dealership presence around Route 440, a more centralized 
commercial location in Jersey City, and that, to that end, 
GM was pursuing a lease option on property in the Route 
440 vicinity. Durkin suggested that GM would be willing to 
offer financial support to New AC to develop the Route 440 
property as a satellite location for a "dualed" 
Chevrolet/Oldsmobile dealership, or to convert New AC's 
existing Kennedy Boulevard facility into one better suited 
for the sale and service of "dualed" Chevrolet and 
Oldsmobile lines. 
 
Although GM offered this compromise, it remained 
steadfast in its insistence that New AC abandon its 
Volkswagen franchise. At the same time that Durkin 
suggested that GM would support the addition of an 
Oldsmobile line, he made clear to New AC that the 
continuation of the Volkswagen franchise was not a 
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workable option: "Under any circumstances, whether or not 
you choose to pursue the opportunities outlined above, the 
continued unauthorized presence of Volkswagen at your 
current location remains an unacceptable violation of your 
Dealer Sales and Service Agreement." In addition, 
throughout the summer and fall of 1997, GM repeatedly 
sent letters to New AC reiterating that New AC's continued 
operation of the Volkswagen franchise was in violation of 
the Dealer Agreement. 
 
Throughout the summer and fall of 1997, New AC and 
GM explored the viability of the proposed Oldsmobile 
compromise. GM investigated the possibility of leasing 
various sites along the Route 440 corridor, and repeatedly 
extended the deadline for New AC to accept or reject the 
Oldsmobile compromise. Ultimately, this proposed plan fell 
through when GM informed New AC that it was unable to 
complete leasing arrangements for the Route 440 sites it 
had contemplated, and when New AC responded by 
insisting that it would not discontinue its Volkswagen 
franchise. New AC contended that it had adequately 
addressed GM's concerns about the "dualing" of Chevrolet 
and Volkswagen lines at the Kennedy Boulevard dealership 
by constructing a separate showroom and using a separate 
staff for the Volkswagen vehicles, and by working toward 
creating a separate Volkswagen parts and service facility. 
 
Finally, in January of 1998, about eighteen months after 
New AC first informed GM of its intention to obtain and 
operate a Volkswagen franchise at the Kennedy Boulevard 
dealership, GM terminated New AC's Chevrolet franchise. In 
a letter dated January 5, 1998, Daniel Durkin observed 
that New AC, by maintaining a Volkswagen line, "has been 
in continual violation" of provisions of the Dealer 
Agreement. Specifically, Durkin asserted that New AC was 
in violation of Article 4.4.2 of the agreement, which, as 
noted above, provides that "[n]o change in location or in the 
use of Premises, including addition of any other vehicle 
lines, will be made without [GM's] prior written 
authorization." Durkin also relied on Article 13.1.5 of the 
Dealer Agreement, which identifies the following franchisee 
conduct as a material breach of the agreement: "Any sale, 
transfer, relinquishment, or discontinuance of use by [New 
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AC] of any of the Dealership Premises or other principal 
assets required in the conduct of the Dealership 
Operations, without [GM's] prior written approval." Durkin 
informed New AC that, because of these material breaches, 
GM was electing "to terminate the Dealer Sales and Service 
Agreement and cease all business relationships with The 
New A.C. Chevrolet Company effective sixty days from. . . 
receipt of this letter." 
 
B. Procedural History 
 
1. The Pleadings 
 
The present litigation commenced when, on January 5, 
1998--the same day on which Durkin informed New AC of 
its termination as a Chevrolet franchisee--GM filed a 
complaint in the District Court seeking a declaration that 
its termination of the New AC franchise was lawful. Count 
I of GM's complaint requested a declaration that the 
termination did not constitute a breach of any provision of 
the Dealer Agreement. Count II requested a declaration that 
the termination did not violate the federal Automobile 
Dealers Day in Court Act (ADDCA), 15 U.S.C. SS 1221-25. 
Count III asked for a declaration that the termination was 
not in violation of New Jersey's Franchise Practices Act 
(NJFPA), N.J. Stat. Ann. SS 56:10-1 to 56:10-15.2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. In its August 26, 1998 order, the District Court granted GM leave to 
amend this original complaint, to include claims based on New AC's 
post-termination conduct, particularly New AC's continued display of 
Chevrolet and GM signage after the revocation of its Chevrolet franchise. 
In its amended complaint, GM asserted that New AC's use of such 
signage violated the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. S 1051 et seq. (Counts VI 
and VII); the common law of trademark infringement and unfair 
competition (Count VIII); and Article 17.5 of the Dealer Agreement 
(Count IX). Counts I, II, and III of the Amended Complaint rescribed the 
three counts contained in GM's original complaint, requesting a 
declaration that New AC's termination did not breach the Dealer 
Agreement and did not contravene the ADDCA or the NJFPA. GM's 
amended complaint also contained five counts based on two other post- 
termination actions allegedly taken by New AC. Because GM eventually 
consented to the dismissal of all five of these counts, in connection with 
the District Court's March 8, 2000 order granting GM summary 
judgment, these claims are not at issue on this appeal. 
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On April 2, 1998, New AC responded by filing a nine- 
count counterclaim, basically alleging that GM's course of 
conduct in dealing with New AC violated the express and 
implied terms of the Dealer Agreement, as well as the 
ADDCA, and the NJFPA. (The specific allegations made in 
particular counts will be set forth below, as they become 
relevant to our analysis.) In terms of relief, New AC 
requested $25 million in compensatory damages plus 
additional punitive damages on each of the first eight 
counts, and an injunction preventing GM from terminating 
New AC's Chevrolet franchise and ordering GM to allow 
New AC to operate a Volkswagen franchise. 
 
2. The Principal Orders 
 
Although New AC's appeal challenges a series of orders 
entered by the District Court during the two-year course of 
this litigation, New AC's most significant contentions arise 
in connection with only two, the January 13, 1999 order 
partially granting GM's motion to dismiss seven of the nine 
counts of New AC's counterclaim, and the March 8, 2000 
order granting GM summary judgment, see General Motors 
Corp. v. New A.C. Chevrolet, Inc., 91 F. Supp. 2d 733 
(D.N.J. 2000). We summarize these two orders here; we will 
discuss the details of the remaining challenged orders 
below (particularly infra in note 25), as they become 
pertinent to our analysis. 
 
GM filed a motion to dismiss seven of the nine counts in 
New AC's counterclaim, which the District Court granted in 
an order and accompanying opinion entered on January 
13, 1999. On this appeal, New AC only challenges the 
District Court's dismissal of Counts One and Four. In 
Count One, New AC alleged that GM violated the ADDCA by 
engaging in a course of wrongful conduct that rose to the 
level of coercion and intimidation. The District Court 
disagreed, concluding that the coercion and intimidation 
alleged by New AC did not constitute the type of coercion 
and intimidation required for an ADDCA violation. 
 
In Count Four, New AC alleged that GM breached the 
express and implied terms of the Dealer Agreement by 
allowing the DiFeo Chevrolet franchise to relocate, and by 
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"refusing to comply with its self-imposed mediation 
process." The District Court decided that the contentions 
contained in Count Four failed to state a claim, on the 
grounds that the counterclaim failed to allege any facts 
indicating that New AC was denied an opportunity to 
participate in private mediation, or that GM acted in bad 
faith in permitting the DiFeo relocation. 
 
Following the Court's January 13, 1999 order dismissing 
seven of the nine counts contained in the counterclaim, 
only Counts Two and Three, both asserting that GM 
violated the NJFPA, remained alive. Count Two alleged that 
GM had violated S 56:10-5 of the NJFPA, prohibiting the 
termination of motor vehicle dealers without "good cause." 
Count Three alleged that GM had violated S 56:10-7(e) of 
the NJFPA, barring the imposition of unreasonable 
standards of performance on automobile dealers, by 
imposing unreasonable restrictions on New AC. New AC 
and GM proceeded to discovery on Counts Two and Three 
of New AC's counterclaim, as well as on all of the claims set 
forth in GM's amended complaint. 
 
After the conclusion of discovery, GM moved for summary 
judgment, see Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56, on the portions of its 
amended complaint alleging that New AC's franchise 
termination was lawful (Counts I, II, and III) and that New 
AC's post-termination use of GM signage was unlawful 
(Counts VI, VII, VIII, and IX). GM also sought summary 
judgment against New AC on Counts Two and Three of the 
counterclaim just described. New AC cross-moved for 
summary judgment with respect to GM's entire amended 
complaint. 
 
In its March 8, 2000 order and accompanying opinion, 
the District Court resolved the summary judgment motions 
in GM's favor. See General Motors Corp., 91 F. Supp. 2d at 
734. With respect to Count I of the amended complaint, 
which seeks a declaration that New AC's termination was in 
accord with the provisions of the Dealer Agreement, the 
Court concluded that the plain language of the agreement 
clearly gave GM the authority to end New AC's franchise 
based on New AC's addition of a Volkswagen line over GM's 
express objection. See id. at 738-39. With respect to Count 
II of the amended complaint, which seeks a declaration that 
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the termination was proper under the ADDCA, the Court 
observed that New AC had failed to furnish any factual 
support for the claim that GM's conduct amounted to 
coercion or intimidation. See id. at 739-40. Finally, with 
respect to Count III of the amended complaint and Counts 
Two and Three of New AC's counterclaim, which focus on 
the NJFPA, the Court found that New AC's unauthorized 
addition of a Volkswagen line constituted "good cause" for 
termination as that term is defined in the NJFPA, and 
further concluded that New AC had failed to present any 
evidence that the performance standards imposed by GM 
on New AC were unreasonable. See id. at 740-41. 
 
The District Court's March 8, 2000 order also granted 
summary judgment for GM on Counts VI, VII, VIII, and IX, 
the sections of GM's amended complaint contending that 
New AC's continued post-termination display of GM signage 
violated federal and state trademark and unfair competition 
law, and breached the terms of the Dealer Agreement. See 
id. at 741-43. Although adjudicating New AC liable for 
trademark infringement, the March 8, 2000 order did not 
set the amount of GM's damages. Rather, the District Court 
directed the parties to submit additional briefs regarding 
the proper measure of damages, the amount of time New 
AC was to be granted for removal of the GM signage, and 
whether New AC was entitled to compensation for the 
signage under the NJFPA. See id. at 743. 
 
New AC timely appealed the March 8, 2000 order (and a 
subsequent April 5, 2000 order awarding GM relief) to this 
Court. The District Court had federal question jurisdiction 
over the ADDCA and Lanham Act claims under 28 U.S.C. 
S 1331, and diversity jurisdiction over the state common 
law and statutory claims under 28 U.S.C. S 1332. For the 
reasons set forth in the margin, notwithstanding GM's 
objections, we have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
S 1291 over all of the orders challenged by New AC.3 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. In its notice of appeal, New AC relates that it is appealing from the 
District Court's March 8, 2000 order granting GM summary judgment 
and its April 5, 2000 order awarding GM relief. In the March 8, 2000 
order, the District Court adjudicated all of the open liability issues in 
the 
litigation, determining that GM was not to be held liable for its 
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II. The March 8, 2000 Order 
 
We first take up New AC's challenges to the District 
Court's March 8, 2000 order, which finally adjudicated 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
termination of New AC's Chevrolet franchise, and that New AC was 
responsible for its post-termination use of GM's trademarks. The April 5, 
2000 order further specified the relief that GM was to receive: the 
District Court entered a permanent injunction against New AC, 
prohibiting its continued use of GM's marks; granted GM attorneys fees 
in the amount of $15,940.32; and awarded GM damages in the amount 
of "10% of defendant's [i.e., New AC's] profits, trebled; profits to be 
measured from May 20, 1998, through the date of this Order [i.e., April 
5, 2000]." The April 5, 2000 order, however, did not reduce the amount 
of these damages to a sum certain. 
 
Prior to the filing of the appellate briefs, GM moved to dismiss the 
appeal, contending that the District Court's order was not final for 
purposes of 28 U.S.C. S 1291, and this motion has been pending before 
us. Were our finality determination to be based solely on the face of the 
March 8, 2000 and April 5, 2000 orders, we would be constrained to 
conclude that the orders were not final under S 1291. Section 1291 of 
Title 28 authorizes appellate jurisdiction over inter alia "all final 
decisions of the district courts of the United States." 28 U.S.C. S 1291. 
A final order is one that "ends the litigation on the merits and leaves 
nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment." Catlin v. United 
States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945). 
 
In general terms, a decision that fixes the parties' liability but leaves 
damages unspecified is not final, and the adjudication of liability is not 
immediately appealable. See United States v. Schaefer Brewing Co., 356 
U.S. 227, 233-34 (1958); Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. Benefits 
Review Bd., 535 F.2d 758, 760 (3d Cir. 1986) (per curiam). Although the 
District Court's April 5, 2000 order set forth a reasonably precise 
formula for the determination of damages (i.e., 10% of net profits during 
a specified period of time), so that one could characterize the 
unperformed damage calculation as a merely mechanical or ministerial 
act that would not preclude our exercise of appellate jurisdiction, see 
Parks v. Pavkovic, 753 F.2d 1397, 1402 (7th Cir. 1985) (determining that 
S 1291 finality exists when "computing the money owed . . . is unlikely 
to engender dispute or controversy, and will require no analytic or 
judgmental determinations that might . . . give rise to other appealable 
questions"), our precedent squarely forecloses us from doing so. See 
Marshak v. Treadwell, 240 F.3d 184, 191 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that an 
order awarding the defendants damages for trademark infringement in 
the amount of "the profits [plaintiff] earned in each year, beginning with 
 
                                17 
  
GM's liability for the termination of New AC's Chevrolet 
franchise, granting summary judgment in GM's favor. See 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
the first act of infringement in 1970 and ending with the first day of 
trial 
testimony in this case" was not final because the damage calculation 
"cannot reasonably be characterized as merely ministerial. . . . [T]he 
parties here have a long history of contentious litigation, and there is a 
substantial likelihood that `one or both parties will dispute the ultimate 
amount of damages awarded . . . .' "); Apex Fountain Sales, Inc. v. 
Kleinfeld, 27 F.3d 931, 934, 936 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that a civil 
contempt order directing that an accounting be performed to determine 
the net profit the plaintiff would have realized absent the defendant's 
contemptuous conduct was not final, because "no judgment containing 
a final dollar amount ha[d] been entered" and because the factual 
determination of net profit "will not be easily reached"). 
 
In the instant matter, however, the analysis of our appellate 
jurisdiction is not limited by the face of the March 8, 2000 and April 5, 
2000 orders, as subsequent, post-appeal proceedings bear directly on 
our S 1291 finality calculus. See Aluminum Co. of America v. Beazer East, 
Inc., 124 F.3d 551, 557 (3d Cir. 1997) ("Even if the appeals court would 
have lacked jurisdiction at the time an appeal was filed, the court has 
jurisdiction if, as a result of subsequent events, there are no longer any 
claims left to be resolved by the district court."). Following the 
District 
Court's April 5, 2000 order, the only claims left to be resolved were the 
application of the damage formula and the reduction of damages to a 
sum certain. During the pendency of this appeal before this Court, the 
District Court actively managed the matter in order to arrive at a precise 
damage figure. On November 8, 2000, the Magistrate Judge submitted a 
report and recommendation fixing the damages New AC owed to GM not 
only under the April 5, 2000 order, but also under a subsequent May 11, 
2000 order holding New AC in civil contempt for failing to comply with 
the April 5, 2000 directive to cease use of GM's trademarks. The final 
figure, covering all of the damages and attorneys fees awarded to GM, 
was set at $324,644.52. The parties filed no objections to the report and 
recommendation, and the District Court approved the Magistrate Judge's 
report on December 12, 2000. In that December 12, 2000 order, the 
District Court also entered a final judgment against New AC for the 
$324,644.52 damage amount, and neither New AC nor GM noticed an 
appeal. It is clear that this order adjudicated all of the unresolved 
issues 
then-pending before the court, and we thus conclude that these post- 
appeal adjudications suffice to render New AC's appeal from the March 
8, 2000 and April 5, 2000 orders final for S 1291 purposes. GM's motion 
to dismiss the appeal is therefore denied. 
 
There is one final issue presented regarding the scope of our appellate 
jurisdiction. New AC's appeal presents challenges not only to the March 
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General Motors Corp. v. New A.C. Chevrolet, Inc., 91 F. 
Supp. 2d 733, 734 (D.N.J. 2000). Our review of a grant or 
denial of summary judgment is plenary. See Mathews v. 
Lancaster Gen. Hosp., 87 F.3d 624, 632 (3d Cir. 1996). We 
may uphold the grant of summary judgment only if, like the 
District Court, we determine that there are no genuine 
issues of material fact and the movant is entitled to 
summary judgment as a matter of law. See Tice v. Centre 
Area Transp. Auth., 247 F.3d 506, 511 n.2 (3d Cir. 2001). 
In making this determination, we view the facts in the light 
most favorable to the non-moving party. See id.  
 
Although New AC's briefing falls far short of analytical 
clarity, it appears that New AC raises three basic, 
alternative grounds for reversal of the District Court's 
March 8, 2000 disposition. First, New AC appears to 
contend that there is a genuine issue as to whether a 
breach of the Dealer Agreement occurred at all (and hence 
whether GM had "good cause" for termination), since, in 
New AC's submission, the terms of the franchise agreement 
did not prohibit its specific "dualing" of a separate 
Volkswagen line. Second, New AC offers the alternative 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8, 2000 and April 5, 2000 orders identified in New AC's notice of appeal, 
but also to a series of non-final orders entered earlier in the 
litigation. 
Specifically, New AC contests (1) a May 15, 1998 order denying New AC 
a preliminary injunction; (2) an August 26, 1998 order denying New AC's 
motion to dismiss; (3) a January 13, 1999 order partially granting GM's 
motion to dismiss; (4) orders entered on March 8, 1999 and April 28, 
1999 by the Magistrate Judge that limited the scope of New AC's 
discovery; and (5) an order entered on August 4, 1999 denying New AC's 
motion for disqualification of the District Judge originally assigned to 
the 
case and vacatur of all orders entered by that Judge. Generally, we 
construe notices of appeal liberally and, therefore, we review earlier 
non- 
final orders not specified in the notice of appeal where (1) there is a 
connection between the specified and unspecified order; (2) the intention 
to appeal the unspecified order is apparent; and (3) the opposing party 
is not prejudiced and has a full opportunity to brief the issues. See 
Pacitti v. Macy's, 193 F.3d 766, 777 (3d Cir. 1999). Because we find that 
all of these elements are clearly satisfied in this case, we conclude that 
the scope of our appellate jurisdiction encompasses all of the prior non- 
final orders, unspecified in the notice of appeal, to which New AC 
currently raises challenges. 
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argument that, even if its addition of a Volkswagen 
franchise did represent a breach of the terms of the Dealer 
Agreement, the "dualing" was not sufficiently egregious to 
justify New AC's franchise termination, i.e., the breach was 
not material. Finally, New AC contends, in essence, that 
even if the District Court was correct in determining that 
New AC did not substantially comply with the Dealer 
Agreement by insisting on the addition of a Volkswagen 
line, reversal of the summary judgment grant on the NJFPA 
claims is warranted because the Court erred in concluding 
that GM's motivation for terminating the franchise--i.e., 
GM's good faith or lack thereof--was irrelevant to the 
question whether GM had "good cause" for New AC's 




New AC's first major contention with respect to the 
District Court's summary judgment grant in the March 8, 
2000 order is with the conclusion that a breach of the 
Dealer Agreement occurred at all. In New AC's submission, 
the terms of the Dealer Agreement never prohibited the 
addition of a Volkswagen franchise at a separate dealership 
site, and thus, GM's permission was never required for the 
Volkswagen addition. In New AC's view, GM was powerless 
to object to the addition because New AC did not employ 
any of the space it had previously dedicated to GM use to 
later sell and service Volkswagen automobiles. This is what 
the District Court, in its prior May 15, 1998 opinion, 
referred to as the "different premises" /"different 
businesses" theory. In essence, New AC contends that there 
is a genuine issue as to whether it breached the terms of 
the franchise agreement at all, and that the District Court 
erred in deciding otherwise. We disagree. 
 
The "different premises" / "different business" line of 
argument rests heavily on an interpretation of New AC's 
obligations under the Dealer Agreement with respect to its 
dealership facilities. The key word on which New AC 
focuses is the term "premises," which appears in both 
Articles 4.4.2 and 13.1.5 of the Dealer Agreement, the 
provisions that GM claims New AC materially breached by 
insisting on the addition of a Volkswagen line of vehicles. 
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Specifically, Article 4.4.2 states in relevant part that "[n]o 
change in location or in the use of Premises, including 
addition of any other vehicle lines, will be made without 
[GM's] prior written authorization." (emphasis added). 
Article 13.1.5 includes in the list of dealer actions that 
constitute material breaches of the Agreement, "[a]ny sale, 
transfer, relinquishment, or discontinuance of use by 
Dealer of any of the Dealership Premises or other principal 
assets required in the conduct of the Dealership 
Operations, without [GM's] prior written approval." 
(emphasis added). 
 
New AC asserts that the term "premises" should be read 
narrowly to cover only the physical facilities accompanying 
the 3085 Kennedy Boulevard address. According to New 
AC, the Volkswagen showroom is located at a site adjacent 
to and physically distinct from the facilities at 3085 
Kennedy Boulevard, a site assigned the address of 3081 
Kennedy Boulevard. Moreover, New AC submits that, at 
least as of 1998, it was close to setting up a separate parts 
and service area for the Volkswagen vehicles, and informed 
GM that it would use different staffs to sell and service its 
Chevrolet and Volkswagen automobiles. Thus, New AC's 
argument goes, the Volkswagen site is separate and distinct 
from the New AC dealership's "premises," and the site's use 
by New AC for Volkswagen purposes does not represent a 
change in the location or use of New AC's "premises" within 
the meaning of Article 4.4.2, or a transfer or 
discontinuance of "premises" use within the meaning of 
Article 13.1.5. 
 
In granting summary judgment to GM on Count I of its 
amended complaint, the District Court dismissed New AC's 
"different premises" / "different business" theory in a 
footnote: 
 
        This Court rejects New A.C.'s effort to redefine the 
       term "Premises" to avoid the clear meaning of this 
       contractual provision. The "Premises" is clearly the 
       dealership property being operated as an exclusive 
       Chevrolet franchise as defined in the Location and 
       Premises Addendum to General Motors Corporation 
       Dealer Sales and Service Agreement . . . . GM's 
       decision to denominate minimum requirements 
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       governing the display of Chevrolet vehicles, et cetera, 
       does not alter the fact that the "Premises" included all 
       dealership property located at 3085 Kennedy 
       Boulevard, Jersey City, New Jersey. 
 
General Motors Corp., 91 F. Supp. 2d at 739 n.9. On 
appeal, New AC takes issue with the District Court's 
conclusion, claiming that the District Court's interpretation 
of the term "premises" as used in the Dealer Agreement is 
incorrect. 
 
According to New AC, a correct interpretation of the term 
must start with Article 4.4.1, which states: "Dealer agrees 
to conduct Dealership Operations only from the approved 
location(s) within its Area of Primary Responsibility. The 
Location and Premises Addendum identifies Dealer's 
approved location(s) and facilities ("Premises")." New AC 
asserts that the terms "location" and "facilities" are 
conceptually separate; i.e. that "location" refers to the street 
address of the dealership (3085 Kennedy Boulevard) while 
the term "facilities" refers to the square footage 
designations made in the Location and Premises 
Addendum. (Under the terms of the franchise relationship, 
New AC is obligated to submit such an Addendum, which 
lists the various dealer locations, and contains a"premises 
space analysis" showing the manner in which the dealer's 
different departments allocate stalls and square footage 
between GM and non-GM uses.) Furthermore, New AC 
asserts, the term "premises" covers only the dealer's 
"facilities" and not its "location." Thus, New AC's argument 
goes, the District Court erred by concluding that the term 
"premises" covered all dealership property at 3085 Kennedy 
Boulevard, rather than just the stall and square footage 
designations listed in the Location and Premises 
Addendum. 
 
Like the District Court, we are dubious of New AC's 
Addendum-only construction of the term "premises." 
However, we need not decide whether this construction is 
the appropriate one. We believe that New AC's argument 
loses on its own terms because, even accepting arguendo 
New AC's assertion that "premises" covers only the stall and 
square footage designations listed in the Location and 
Premises Addendum, the Addenda in the record before us 
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indisputably demonstrate that at least a portion of the 
"facilities" (and hence "premises") originally allocated to GM 
use at 3085 Kennedy Boulevard would be (and presumably 
were) converted to Volkswagen use with the addition of the 
Volkswagen line. 
 
In the 1990 Location and Premises Addendum for 3085 
Kennedy Boulevard, furnished to GM prior to New AC's 
request for the Volkswagen addition, all of the space was 
allocated to GM use. Conversely, the proposed 1996 
Addendum, which New AC supplied at GM's request once 
New AC asked for permission to add a Volkswagen line to 
its dealership, clearly indicates that some of the space 
originally dedicated to GM use would be shifted to the 
Volkswagen line. For instance, 100 square feet of general 
office space and 900 square feet of part storage space 
would be converted to Volkswagen use, as would four 
mechanical service bays.4 Accordingly, even were we 
inclined to follow New AC's suggestion to construe 
"premises" narrowly to include only the space allocations 
contained in the Location and Premises Addenda, those 
Addenda demonstrate that at least some portion of the 
"premises" at 3085 Kennedy Boulevard were transferred 
from GM to Volkswagen use. Thus, the space-designation- 
only argument offers New AC no assistance, and we 
conclude that New AC breached Articles 4.4.2 and 13.1.5 of 
the Dealer Agreement. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. At various times, New AC indicated to GM that it would eventually 
move the Volkswagen service and parts storage facilities to a separate, 
physically distinct space. The record does not indicate whether this was 
eventually accomplished. The record does show that, at least as of May 
14, 1998, over four months after GM informed New AC that its Chevrolet 
franchise was terminated and six days before the termination was 
formally implemented, New AC was continuing to devote four service 
bays and part of the small parts department at the 3085 Kennedy 
Boulevard location to Volkswagen use. At all events, the dispositive 
question here is whether New AC was in material breach of the Dealer 
Agreement as of the time GM decided to terminate the Dealer Agreement, 
thereby furnishing GM with a justifiable ground for termination, rather 
than whether such a breach continued to exist at some point thereafter. 
 




As an alternative challenge to the District Court's March 
8, 2000 grant of summary judgment, New AC submits that 
its addition of a Volkswagen franchise over GM's express 
and repeated objections, even if considered a breach of the 
Dealer Agreement, was not egregious enough to warrant 
severance of the franchise relationship. New AC's argument 
here is that any breach that it committed was not a 
material one, and thus did not justify termination of the 
franchise contract.5 We disagree, concluding that, on the 
record before us, there is no genuine issue that New AC's 
Volkswagen addition constituted a material breach. 
 
Materiality goes to the essence of the contract; a breach 
is material if it "will deprive the injured party of the benefit 
that is justifiably expected" under the contract. 2 E. Allan 
Farnsworth, Farnsworth on Contracts S 8.16, at 497 (2d ed. 
1998). We think there can be no dispute that New AC's 
insistence on adding a Volkswagen franchise to its 
dealership, contrary to GM's repeated objections to this 
decision, rose to the level of material breach. GM's 
justifiable expectations regarding New AC's performance 
under the franchise agreement are best evidenced by the 
provisions of the Dealer Agreement. In Article 13.1, the 
parties to the Dealer Agreement explicitly defined certain 
acts or events as constituting material breaches of the 
contract. Article 13.1.5 specifically includes as a material 
breach, "[a]ny sale, transfer, relinquishment, or 
discontinuance of use by Dealer of any of the Dealership 
Premises or other principal assets required in the conduct 
of the Dealership Operations, without [GM's] prior written 
approval." 
 
To similar effect is Article 4.4.2, which directly governs 
situations in which a dealer seeks to add another vehicle 
franchise: "No change in location or in the use of Premises, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. It is hornbook law that when one party to a contract commits a 
material breach, the non-breacher has the option of either continuing 
the contract and suing for partial breach, or terminating the agreement 
in its entirety. See 2 E. Allan Farnsworth, Farnsworth on Contracts 
S 8.16, at 495 (2d ed. 1998). In the case of a non-material breach, the 
termination option is not open to the non-breacher. See id. at 495-96. 
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including addition of any other vehicle lines, will be made 
without [GM]'s prior written authorization."6 In light of our 
discussion supra in Part II.A regarding New AC's "different 
premises" / "different business" theory, it is clear that New 
AC's operation of a Volkswagen franchise and its blatant 
disregard of GM's objection to that addition violated Articles 
13.1.5 and 4.4.2 of the Dealer Agreement, and 
consequently represented a material breach of the franchise 
agreement. 
 
To be sure, absent Articles 13.1.5 and 4.4.2, New AC 
would have the generally unfettered right to put its 
dealership property to the uses it sees fit, including the 
operation of an independent and competing vehicle line. 
See 1 Gladys Glickman, Franchising, S 10.07[7], at 10-72 
(2001) ("If the franchisee is the owner or lessee of the 
premises from which the franchised business is conducted 
he or she has the right to use the premises for any purpose 
permitted by the zoning laws and the landlord unless the 
franchisor, by contract, further restricts the businesses 
which may be operated on the premises."). In New AC's 
case, however, the parties mutually agreed to constrain the 
exercise of that right by conferring on GM the power to 
disapprove of a proposal to "dual" another vehicle line, a 
power which GM clearly and consistently employed to deny 
New AC's request to add a Volkswagen line to its 
dealership. 
 
Mindful of the disparity in bargaining leverage that can 
arise between a franchisor and franchisee, we do not 
suggest that Articles 4.4.2 or 13.1.5, or GM's reliance on 
those contractual provisions to disapprove of New AC's 
decision to "dual" a Volkswagen franchise, are unassailable. 
We think, for instance, that New AC could raise viable 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Although Article 4.4.2 is not included within Article 13.1's enumerated 
list of material breaches, Article 13.1.13 makes clear that the list is 
non- 
exhaustive, stating (perhaps tautologically) that"[a]ny other material 
breach of Dealer's obligations under this Agreement not otherwise 
identified in this Article 13 or in Article 14" can constitute a material 
breach. Given the substantial similarity of the obligations imposed by 
Articles 4.4.2 and 13.1.5 on a franchisee seeking to alter the use of its 
dealership facilities, we believe that a violation of Article 4.4.2 will 
typically amount to a material breach of the Dealer Agreement. 
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challenges to those provisions on the ground that such 
anti-"dualing" provisions in general impose unreasonable 
obligations on franchisees like New AC, or that GM's 
reliance on such provisions in New AC's particular case 
constitutes an unreasonable application of the anti- 
"dualing" prohibition. In regard to the former contention, 
New AC has never challenged Articles 4.4.2 or 13.1.5-- 
either in the District Court, see General Motors Corp., 91 F. 
Supp. 2d at 739 n.8, or on this appeal--on the ground that 
such anti-"dualing" proscriptions constitute, as a general 
matter, unreasonable restrictions on a franchisee's rights.7 
 
We assume, therefore, that Articles 4.4.2 and 13.1.5 
impose reasonable obligations on franchisees, and conclude 
that a franchisee's breach of a reasonable franchise 
obligation--committed over the express and persistent 
objections of the franchisor--is a material one. Cf. Amerada 
Hess Corp. v. Quinn, 362 A.2d 1258, 1268-69 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. Law Div. 1976) ("Plainly, noncompliance by a franchisee 
with his reasonable franchise obligations, resulting in an 
actual or potential adverse effect upon the sales of the 
franchisor's products, would constitute substantial 
noncompliance thereof for purposes of termination, 
impairing as it does the franchisor's fundamental reason for 
initially entering into the relationship."); accord Brattleboro 
Auto Sales, Inc. v. Subaru of New England, Inc., 633 F.2d 
649, 652 (2d Cir. 1980) (upholding a manufacturer's 
termination of a Subaru dealer under the Vermont 
franchise practices statute, on the ground that the 
manufacturer "reasonably could have concluded that [the 
dealer's] sales and service of Subaru cars would suffer as a 
result of [the dealer's] simultaneous promotion of several 
lines of directly competing cars"). 
 
New AC, however, does appear to contest the 
reasonableness of GM's reliance on the anti-"dualing" 
provisions of the Dealer Agreement in this particular case, 
attempting to minimize the seriousness of its breach by 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Instead, New AC focused on arguing that its addition of a Volkswagen 
line never violated the anti-"dualing" provisions of Articles 13.1.5 or 
4.2.2, because Volkswagen-related activities would occur at a separate 
vehicle site. We rejected this argument supra  in Part II.A. 
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summarily asserting that, because GM permits numerous 
other dealers to operate additional vehicle lines, New AC's 
addition of a Volkswagen line over GM's objections could 
not affect the core of the franchise relationship between GM 
and New AC, and thus does not rise to the level of a 
material breach. If the evidence proffered by New AC 
demonstrated that GM routinely permitted dealers similarly 
situated to New AC--e.g., in similar geographical areas, 
with similar competitors and consumer bases--to operate 
competing vehicle franchises, then such evidence would 
tend to show that GM arbitrarily withheld its approval of 
New AC's proposed Volkswagen addition, and could 
significantly undermine the idea that GM justifiably and 
reasonably expected its franchisees to offer only single, GM 
vehicle lines. However, New AC makes no such showing. 
 
While we may judicially notice the existence of multi-line 
vehicle dealers, New AC points to no record evidence 
identifying any of the other GM dealers operating multi-line 
dealerships, or indicating which vehicle lines are offered at 
those dealerships. More importantly, New AC offers no 
evidence tending to show that these multi-line dealers are 
similarly situated to New AC. In sum, based on the record 
evidence before us, there is no genuine issue as to the fact 
that New AC's decision to add a Volkswagen franchise 




8. New AC raises this same basic argument in the context of challenging 
the District Court's grant of summary judgment on the NJFPA claims, 
i.e., Count III of GM's amended complaint and Count Two of New AC's 
counterclaim, framing the contention in slightly different doctrinal 
terms. 
New AC argues that GM did not have the "good cause" necessary to 
lawfully terminate New AC's Chevrolet franchise in accordance with 
S 56:10-5 of the NJFPA because New AC never failed to "substantially 
comply" with its obligations under the franchise agreement. We find New 
AC's argument here similarly unpersuasive. 
 
First, we believe that our determination as to whether New AC's breach 
was material under the terms of the franchise agreement resolves the 
question whether New AC "substantially compl[ied]" with the agreement 
for purposes of S 56:10-5's "good cause" requirement. N.J. Stat. Ann. 
S 56:10-5. Put simply, we see no real or practical difference between a 
conclusion that a party materially breached a contract, and a conclusion 
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C. "Good Cause" 
 
New AC's best argument for reversal of the District 
Court's grant of summary judgment for GM concerns the 
NJFPA claims. Before the District Court and again on 
appeal, New AC argues that, although the NJFPA defines 
"good cause" solely as "failure by the franchisee to 
substantially comply with those requirements imposed 
upon him by the franchise," N.J. Stat. Ann. S 56:10-5, a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
that the party failed to substantially comply with its obligations under a 
contract. To decide otherwise would be simply to engage in linguistic 
games. Cf. Farnsworth, S 8.16, at 496 ("The doctrine of material breach 
is simply the converse of the doctrine of substantial performance. 
Substantial performance is performance without a material breach, and 
a material breach results in performance that is not substantial."); cf. 
also Amerada Hess, 362 A.2d at 1266-67 (observing that the well- 
established "concept of substantial performance .. . generally utilized in 
the realm of building contracts but applied, where appropriate, to other 
contractual agreements as well" "has been carried into the franchise 
milieu by the `good cause' requirement for termination"--specifically, by 
S 56:10-5's substantial non-compliance standard). 
 
At all events, we find New AC's contention unavailing, even leaving 
aside our analysis of the materiality of New AC's breach. In asserting 
that New AC's conduct in connection with the Volkswagen franchise did 
not rise to the level of substantial noncompliance necessary for "good 
cause" under the NJFPA, New AC cites for comparison two decisions in 
which a franchisee's breach was held to constitute substantial 
noncompliance for purposes of S 56:10-5. See Jiffy Lube Int'l, Inc. v. 
Weiss Bros., Inc., 834 F. Supp. 683 (D.N.J. 1993); Amerada Hess Corp. 
v. Quinn, 362 A.2d 1258 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1976). We believe, 
however, that New AC's conduct in this case is at least as egregious and 
serious as the franchisees' actions in Amerada Hess and Jiffy Lube. Like 
the franchisee in Jiffy Lube, New AC deliberately disregarded its 
obligations to its franchisor GM, insisting on maintaining a competing 
manufacturer's vehicle line even in the face of GM's numerous and 
repeated objections. Moreover, like the franchise arrangement in Jiffy 
Lube, the Dealer Agreement between GM and New AC made the pertinent 
obligations explicit, and authorized GM to terminate the relationship if 
those requirements were violated, thereby indicating the integral nature 
of those obligations to the franchise relationship. In sum, we conclude 
that there is no genuine issue either that New AC's conduct materially 
breached the Dealer Agreement, or that such breach constituted 
substantial noncompliance within the meaning ofS 56:10-5. 
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franchisor cannot possess the requisite "good cause" unless 
it also acts in good faith (and without an improper, 
pretextual motive). New AC then challenges the District 
Court's explicit conclusion that, once the Court determined 
that New AC's addition of a Volkswagen line constituted 
"good cause" for terminating the Chevrolet franchise under 
NJFPA S 56:10-5, GM's motive behind that termination was 
entirely irrelevant. See General Motors Corp. , 91 F. Supp. 
2d at 740 n.10.9 
 
The District Court rejected this contention, concluding 
that a franchisor's motivation was irrelevant to the NJFPA 
"good cause" inquiry, in the course of granting summary 
judgment in GM's favor on Count III of GM's amended 
complaint, and on Count Two of New AC's counterclaim, 
both of which raised the question whether GM's 
termination of New AC's Chevrolet franchise constituted a 
violation of S 56:10-5.10 The District Court supported its 
conclusion by citing to Karl's Sales & Service, Inc. v. Gimbel 
Bros., Inc., 592 A.2d 647 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991), 
and Major Oldsmobile, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., No. 95- 
7595, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 11443 (2d Cir. May 17,1996), 
both of which stated that a party's motivation in 
terminating an agreement is irrelevant when the terms of 
the agreement confer upon that party the legal right to 
terminate its obligations. See Karl's Sales, 592 A.2d at 651 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. With respect to this ground for reversal, New AC is not disputing the 
District Court's conclusion that New AC "fail[ed] . . . to substantially 
comply with those requirements imposed upon him by the franchise," 
N.J. Stat. Ann. S 56:10-5, when it chose to"dual" a Volkswagen line at 
its dealership over GM's consistent objections. See General Motors Corp., 
91 F. Supp. 2d at 739. In fact, we have already rejected the argument 
that New AC's "dualing" of Volkswagen did not constitute substantial 
noncompliance within the meaning of S 56:10-5's "good cause" definition. 
See supra note 8. Rather, New AC is arguing here that, even conceding 
that its "dualing" amounts to substantial noncompliance, New Jersey law 
would impose an additional, implicit requirement of good faith before 
"good cause" under the NJFPA could be said to exist. 
 
10. These two claims are mirror images: In Count Two of its 
counterclaim, New AC alleges that GM violated S 56:10-5 by terminating 
its Chevrolet franchise without good cause. In Count III of its amended 
complaint, GM seeks a declaration that the termination was effected with 
good cause, and thus satisfied the requirements ofS 56:10-5. 
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("The law is clear that where the right to terminate a 
contract is absolute under the wording in an agreement, 
the motive of a party in terminating such an agreement is 
irrelevant to the question of whether the termination is 
effective."); Major Oldsmobile, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 11443, 
at *7-8 ("As long as a party has the legal right to terminate 
its obligation under the contract, it is legally irrelevant 
whether the party was also motivated by reasons which 
would not themselves constitute valid grounds for 
termination of the contract.") (internal quotation marks, 
brackets, and citations omitted). 
 
New AC contends that the District Court's reasoning is 
erroneous in that it fails to take account of the obligations 
imposed by S 56:10-5 of the NJFPA on a franchisor 
contemplating a franchise termination, and the manner in 
which that provision modifies, in the franchise context, the 
common law rule regarding severance of a private 
contractual relationship pursuant to a termination at will 
provision. New AC is surely correct in asserting that 
S 56:10-5 modifies the termination provisions of all 
franchise agreements governed by the laws of New Jersey: 
Even if the terms of a private franchise agreement permit 
termination at will, S 56:10-5's good cause requirement will 
supersede that arrangement and impose a good cause 
requirement on the franchisor's decision. This is because 
the NJFPA was enacted in large part to counteract the 
unequal bargaining power between franchisor and 
franchisee, which would allow a franchisor to leverage its 
bargaining strength so as to insert provisions in its private 
agreements with franchisees that would allow it to sever the 
franchise relationship at will. See, e.g., Westfield Ctr. Serv., 
Inc. v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 432 A.2d 48, 53 (N.J. 1981) 
(noting that "[f]ranchisors have drafted contracts permitting 
them to terminate or to refuse renewal of franchises at will" 
and observing that "[t]he New Jersey Legislature was 
sensitive to the overall problem" when it enacted the NJFPA 
in 1971). 
 
Karl's Sales and Major Oldsmobile certainly state the 
proper rule as regards private contractual relationships. 
They apparently were not, however, called upon to consider 
the NJFPA's statutory modification of that relationship; 
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Karl's Sales and Major Oldsmobile neither cite to nor 
discuss the NJFPA in general or S 56:10-5 in particular, 
presumably because NJFPA claims were never raised in 
either case. Insofar as the District Court concluded, solely 
on the authority of Karl's Sales and Major Oldsmobile, that 
a franchisor's motivation is irrelevant to a claim that a 
franchisor's termination violated S 56:10-5, its decision was 
reached in error. 
 
In its appellate briefing and at oral argument, New AC 
goes further and contends that, under New Jersey law, an 
examination of whether a franchisor's termination of a 
franchise was supported by "good cause," within the 
meaning of S 56:10-5, would necessarily include an inquiry 
into whether the franchisor acted in good faith (and without 
some impermissible, pretextual motive). Although this 
argument is an interesting one, and, as we explain briefly 
in the margin, New Jersey law offers no clear answer on 
this point, resolution of this issue is not necessary to our 
disposition.11 This is because, even were we to assume 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. The plain language of S 56:10-5 strongly suggests that good faith (or 
the absence of some pretextual motive) on the part of the franchisor is 
not a requisite element of the "good cause" necessary to terminate a 
franchisee in accordance with the NJFPA. Importantly, S 56:10-5 does 
not leave the term "good cause" open, but rather adopts a specialized 
definition of the phrase: "For the purposes of this act, good cause for 
terminating, canceling, or failing to renew a franchise shall be limited 
to 
failure by the franchisee to substantially comply with those requirements 
imposed upon him by the franchise." N.J. Stat. Ann. S 56:10-5. This 
statutory definition of "good cause" focuses solely on the objective 
actions of the franchisee--i.e., whether the franchisee substantially 
complied with franchise requirements--and not on the subjective 
motivations of the franchisor--i.e., whether the franchisor's decision was 
undertaken in bad faith. 
 
Other pertinent provisions within the NJFPA, particularly S 56:10-9, 
support the idea that a franchisor's motivation is irrelevant to the "good 
cause" inquiry. Section 56:10-9 allows a franchisee's substantial 
noncompliance to serve as a complete defense in"any action" instituted 
under the NJFPA by a franchisee. See N.J. Stat. Ann. S 56:10-9. 
Although we could find no New Jersey cases on point, a fair reading of 
that provision suggests that if a terminated franchisee were to bring an 
action against its franchisor claiming a violation of S 56:10-5 because 
the 
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arguendo that a franchisor's motivation bears on the 
S 56:10-5 "good cause" inquiry, New AC has failed to 
furnish record evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
franchisor lacked the requisite "good cause" for the decision, the 
franchisor could avoid liability simply by demonstrating that the 
franchisee failed to substantially comply with its franchise obligations. 
We also note that when other jurisdictions have desired to include a 
good faith component in the termination provisions of analogous 
franchise protection statutes, they have explicitly done so in the 
language of the statute. See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. S 42-133v(a) (barring 
the termination of a franchise unless the franchisor"has good cause for 
. . . termination . . . and has acted in good faith"); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
S 190.045(1) (Michie) (similar); N.D. Cent. Code S 51-07-01.1 (defining 
"good cause" as "failure . . . to comply with those requirements imposed 
by the written contract" but providing that the franchisor's determination 
of whether "good cause" exists "must be made in good faith"). 
 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, New Jersey courts, in construing 
separate provisions in franchise-related statutes, have imposed good 
faith requirements in particular circumstances, despite the statute's 
omission of an explicit good faith requirement. For instance, in 
Monmouth Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp. , 509 A.2d 161 (N.J. 
1986), the New Jersey Supreme Court construed a provision of the New 
Jersey Motor Vehicle Franchise Act, N.J. Stat. Ann.SS 56:10-16 to 
56:10-25, a statutory scheme animated by the same franchise-oriented 
concerns as the NJFPA. As noted supra note 1, the NJMVFA allows an 
existing automobile dealer to challenge (and eventually enjoin) its 
franchisor's decision to relocate a new dealer into the same market area, 
by demonstrating that such a move would be "injurious" to the existing 
dealer and to the public interest. See N.J. Stat. Ann. SS 56:10-18, 56:10- 
19. Section 56:10-23 enumerates several factors that bear on the 
question whether a relocation is "injurious," but the provision omits 
mention of the franchisor's motivation or good faith as one of the 
relevant factors. Nonetheless, despite this statutory silence, Monmouth 
Chrysler-Plymouth explicitly held that "an additional criterion to be 
considered in determining injury under the Motor Vehicle Franchise Act 
is the motivation of the franchisor in designating the new dealer." 509 
A.2d at 170 (emphasis added). But even were we to predict, based on 
Monmouth Chrylser-Plymouth, that New Jersey would imply a good faith 
element into the NJFPA's "good cause" requirement, such a prediction 
would not affect our disposition. As we explain in the text above, New AC 
has failed to present evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue as to 
GM's bad faith, and thus the District Court's summary judgment grant 
will be affirmed. 
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as to whether GM acted in good faith (or without a 
pretextual motive) in terminating New AC's Chevrolet 
franchise. 
 
New AC's contention that GM acted in bad faith or on 
pretext in ending its franchise relationship with New AC 
centers primarily on what we will call the "Project 2000"or 
"Plan 2000" theory. "Project 2000" is a general business 
plan developed by GM sometime around 1995, and 
continuously implemented thereafter. In developing"Project 
2000," GM officials examined various individual automobile 
marketing areas, and sought to create the optimal plan for 
the sale of GM vehicle lines in those areas. GM officials 
generally believed that the optimal business strategy would 
be to have a single dealer, selling and servicing only a 
single GM line, in each marketing area. 
 
According to New AC's allegations, set forth in its 
counterclaim and repeated in its appellate briefing and at 
oral argument, under the "Project 2000" business plan, 
GM's principal goal for the Hudson County marketing area, 
in which the New AC dealership was located, was to 
establish a single dealer as the exclusive Chevrolet 
franchisee. Furthermore, New AC argues, GM considered 
the Route 440 area to be the most viable commercial strip 
in Jersey City, and wanted its designated Jersey City 
Chevrolet franchise to be located along Route 440. New AC 
contends that, under the "Project 2000" strategy, GM 
preferred that the DiFeo dealership, which moved to a 
Route 440 site in 1995, serve as this exclusive franchisee, 
and therefore favored closing New AC's Chevrolet 
dealership. Thus, according to New AC, when GM decided 
to terminate New AC's franchise, it used New AC's addition 
of a Volkswagen line as a pretext for finally implementing 
its single-dealer, single-line "Project 2000" strategy. 
 
At this stage, however, we are reviewing the District 
Court's grant of summary judgment, and New AC cannot 
simply rest on its mere allegations concerning a"Project 
2000" plan to eliminate its dealership. Rather, New AC 
must point to "pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any," Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56(c), that create a 
genuine issue of material fact that GM adopted a strategy 
 
                                33 
  
designed to eliminate New AC's Chevrolet franchise in 
Jersey City and that GM employed New AC's addition of a 
Volkswagen franchise as a pretextual reason for effecting 
that strategy. Based on the record evidence before us, we 
believe that New AC has failed to create any such genuine 
issue. 
 
Before examining the specific evidence on which New AC 
relies, we note that, other than the general contention that 
the addition of a Volkswagen line was a pretextual reason 
employed by GM to mask the true motive for its termination 
of New AC's Chevrolet franchise, the details of New AC's 
"Project 2000" argument are less than pellucid. We must 
cobble together the specifics of New AC's argument from 
incomplete pieces. Therefore, it is important, at the outset, 
to clarify New AC's contentions so as to get to the heart of 
New AC's argument concerning GM's bad faith and 
pretextual motivation. 
 
New AC does not appear to contend, as a general matter, 
that GM's stated preference for a single-line dealer 
distribution network is either unreasonable or lacking a 
legitimate business justification. That is, New AC does not 
contend that, as a general rule, it is improper for 
automobile manufacturers to preclude their dealers from 
"dualing" another vehicle line. See supra Part II.B. Rather, 
New AC appears to be arguing that, under the particular 
facts of its case, GM's objection to New AC's "dualing" of a 
Volkswagen line was not a good-faith application of a 
single-line preference, but rather a bad-faith, pretextual 
reason, masking another, true motivation behind GM's 
action. According to New AC's opening appellate brief, this 
true motivation is GM's predetermined decision, made as 
early as the mid-1990s as part of "Project 2000," to sever 
its franchise relationship with New AC. 
 
In order to survive summary judgment on this NJFPA 
claim, New AC must point to evidence creating a genuine 
issue of material fact that, prior to New AC's 1996 decision 
to add a Volkswagen franchise, GM decided to end its 
Chevrolet franchise arrangement with New AC, and that 
GM used New AC's operation of a Volkswagen franchise to 
obscure the fact that this decision constituted the true 
motivation behind New AC's termination. As factual support 
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for this theory, New AC focuses primarily on three GM 
corporate documents. The first is an October 5, 1995 
memorandum titled "Dealer Network Planning" and 
addressed to all GM dealers, which announced GM's future 
business strategy, an expansion of the "2000 Plan" 
originally commenced in 1990 (a precursor to "Project 
2000"), designed to increase GM's and its dealers' 
profitability "by assuring that each brand is properly 
presented to the public, and by renewed emphasis on 
having the right number of dealers, at the right locations 
and of the right size." In addition to this general goal, the 
"Dealer Network Planning" memorandum also expressed a 
preference for single dealers in a market area selling only 
single lines of GM vehicles: 
 
       The New General Motors Network Strategy is simple: 
 
        Wherever the local market sales potential for the 
       refocused brand provides an opportunity for a 
       profitable dealership selling and servicing that brand 
       alone, General Motors should have a single line, 
       exclusive dealer conforming in image and customer 
       practices to the norm established for that brand. 
 
       Further, General Motors brands are not commodities 
       and should never be offered to the public from facilities 
       that also offer competing brands. 
 
In New AC's submission, this "Dealer Network Planning" 
memorandum sets forth the core of "Project 2000"--i.e., the 
single-line, single-dealer strategy. 
 
According to New AC, two other corporate documents 
demonstrate the implementation of this "Project 2000" 
single-line, single-dealer strategy in the Jersey City region. 
A report titled "Year 2000 Plan: Essex and Hudson 
Counties, NJ MDAs: Marketing Area Highlights" includes a 
section on State Route 440 in Jersey City, the approximate 
location of both the DiFeo and New AC Chevrolet dealership.12 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. The report itself is not dated. In its opening brief, New AC fixes the 
date of the document as 1992 or 1993. This is consistent with the 
statement made in GM's 1995 "Dealer Network Planning" memorandum, 
which noted that GM had first commenced a "Year 2000" strategy of 
developing the optimal business plan for dealers in specific market 
regions in 1990. 
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In that section, GM identifies the automobile dealerships 
located at the intersection of State Route 440 and 
Communipaw Avenue as "the only primary shopping area 
for Hudson County." The report also contains evaluations of 
both the New AC Chevrolet dealership and the Bell 
Chevrolet dealership (which was subsequently acquired by 
DiFeo). GM observed that both dealerships were in isolated 
neighborhood areas, away from Route 440's "primary 
shopping area," and had out-of-date facilities. However, GM 
appeared much more optimistic about Bell Chevrolet's 
chances for future economic success. 
 
For Bell, the report's evaluation noted that "[t]he plan is 
to relocate to the State Route 440 autorow area in Jersey 
City," while for New AC, the report stated that"viability of 
the dealer point is questionable" and observed that "[t]he 
plan is to maintain representation and monitor viability of 
the point." Finally, a third document, a report dated 
February 7, 1996 and titled "Dealer Year 2000 Plan," set 
forth the updated plan for the New AC dealership:"Monitor 
market conditions -- future viability is questionable." 
 
We are unpersuaded that these documents establish a 
genuine issue that GM, prior to New AC's 1996 request to 
add a Volkswagen dealership, made a decision to terminate 
New AC's Chevrolet franchise. Significantly, none of these 
documents refers to a decision by or an intent on the part 
of GM to end its franchise relationship with New AC. In 
these documents, GM does call New AC's future financial 
viability into question, but there is no indication that, at 
the time these documents were drafted, GM had concluded 
that these economic worries warranted the termination of 
New AC's Chevrolet dealership. 
 
To be sure, New AC could be asking us to infer from the 
concerns expressed by GM in these documents over the 
continued viability of the New AC franchise that, at some 
point subsequent to February 1996 (the date of the most 
recent of the three documents, the "Dealer Year 2000 
Plan"), GM arrived at the conclusion that termination was 
necessary, and opportunistically employed New AC's 1996 
Volkswagen line addition to mask its true motivation.13 In 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. Of course, concerns over the continued financial viability of a 
franchise are likely to constitute legitimate, reasonable business reasons 
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light of the record evidence, however, we believe that "this 
is not a reasonable inference from the evidence but instead 
is a leap of faith." Northview Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors 
Corp., 227 F.3d 78, 95 (3d Cir. 2000). Contrary to New AC's 
contentions concerning GM's bad faith, the record evidence 
indicates that in the period between the time that New AC 
informed GM that it had decided to operate a Volkswagen 
franchise and the time that GM informed New AC of its 
final decision to terminate New AC's Chevrolet franchise-- 
importantly, a period that spanned over one-and-a-half 
years--GM actually sought to preserve its franchise 
relationship with New AC. 
 
New AC first informed GM of its decision to seek a 
Volkswagen franchise on April 2, 1996. Were GM simply 
using the addition of this vehicle line as a pretext to 
implement its predetermined decision to eliminate the New 
AC franchise, one would expect New AC's termination to 
occur shortly after this notification. Yet, even after again 
informing New AC on June 24, 1996 that it was opposed to 
the Volkswagen addition, GM delayed for over eighteen 
months before finally advising New AC on January 5, 1998 
that its Chevrolet franchise was terminated. In the 
intervening period, GM sent New AC repeated warning 
letters, furnishing New AC with numerous opportunities to 
relinquish its Volkswagen franchise and thereby preserve 
its franchise relationship with GM. In fact, as late as May 
13, 1998, the date on which the District Court heard oral 
argument on New AC's motion for a preliminary injunction 
barring its franchise termination, GM's counsel represented 
to the Court that GM was willing to continue New AC's 
Chevrolet franchise provided that New AC ceased offering 
the Volkswagen line. 
 
Moreover, GM did not simply issue warnings to New AC; 
rather, GM sought to forge a compromise position, 
addressing New AC's desire to add another vehicle line by 
offering to help establish an Oldsmobile line at New AC's 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
for the franchise's termination. Therefore, we assume arguendo, as we 
believe New AC would like us to, that GM's pessimistic assessment of 
New AC's potential future performance was unwarranted and unjustified. 
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dealership and indicating that GM was willing to supply 
financial support to New AC. Of course, GM insisted that 
any compromise include New AC's abandonment of the 
Volkswagen franchise, but New AC steadfastly refused to 
take such an action.14 In light of this evidence, we cannot 
help but conclude that New AC has failed to establish a 
genuine issue that GM acted in bad faith or out of an 
improper, pretextual motive in terminating New AC's 
Chevrolet franchise. Accordingly, we affirm the District 
Court's grant of summary judgment in GM's favor on Count 




14. At oral argument, New AC offered a new theory to explain the one- 
and-a-half-year delay between New AC's addition of Volkswagen and 
GM's notice of franchise termination. According to New AC, at around 
the time in 1996 that New AC announced its intention to operate a 
Volkswagen line, DiFeo Chevrolet, the only other Chevrolet franchisee in 
Jersey City, was in the process of ending its operations and 
relinquishing its Chevrolet franchise. Were GM at that time to implement 
its predetermined decision to terminate New AC, it would be left with no 
Chevrolet franchise representation in the Jersey City market area. Thus, 
according to New AC, GM was forced to deal, and attempt to 
compromise, with New AC. 
 
We believe that New AC's proffered theory amounts to pure 
speculation. Importantly, New AC points to no evidence in the record 
providing factual support for this theory. For instance, for New AC's 
account to remain logically consistent, it would need to be shown that 
DiFeo, or some other Chevrolet franchisee, re-commenced operations in 
Jersey City some time prior to GM's January 5, 1998 notice of 
termination to New AC (so that GM could terminate New AC and still 
retain a single Chevrolet franchisee in Jersey City). We could find no 
such evidence in the record before us, however. 
 
15. New AC also contests the District Court's grant of summary 
judgment in GM's favor on Count Three of New AC's counterclaim, which 
alleges that GM violated S 56:10-7 of the NJFPA when it "impose[d] 
unreasonable restrictions upon NEW AC, as a franchised motor vehicle 
dealer, relative to the assertion of its legal or equitable rights 
respective 
to its Chevrolet/Geo franchise." New AC asserts that the Court 
erroneously granted summary judgment here because it mistakenly 
believed that New AC waived its right to oppose GM's summary judgment 
motion by failing to respond to the motion, and/or because the Court 
mistakenly assumed that its disposition of Count Two of the 
 




In short, we believe that none of New AC's challenges 
with respect to the District Court's March 8, 2000 order 
necessitate reversal of that order. Accordingly, the District 
Court's March 8, 2000 order will be affirmed in its entirety. 
 
III. The January 13, 1999 Order 
 
New AC's other principal arguments in this appeal 
challenge the District Court's January 13, 1999 order 
which dismissed inter alia Count One of New AC's 
counterclaim, alleging that GM's course of conduct violated 
the ADDCA, and Count Four, alleging that GM's actions 
violated the express and implied terms of the Dealer 
Agreement. Our review of a district court's decision 
granting a motion to dismiss a claim under Fed. R. Civ. Pro 
12(b)(6) is plenary. See Weston v. Pennsylvania , 251 F.3d 
420, 425 (3d Cir. 2001); Lorenz v. CSX Corp., 1 F.3d 1406, 
1411 (3d Cir. 1993). We accept all factual allegations in the 
complaint as true, and we draw all reasonable inferences in 
the light most favorable to the non-movant. See Weston, 
251 F.3d at 425. We may affirm a 12(b)(6) dismissal only if 
it is certain that no relief could be granted to the non- 
movant under any set of facts which could be proven. See 
id. 
 




In Count One of its counterclaim, New AC alleges that 
GM's actions toward it amounted to a violation of the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
counterclaim controlled its disposition of Count Three. Examining the 
District Court's March 8, 2000 decision, it is clear that the Court 
neither 
relied on a waiver theory nor confused its Count Two analysis with its 
Count Three analysis. Rather, the Court granted summary judgment for 
GM on Count Three for the independent reason that New AC failed to 
create a genuine issue as to the unreasonableness of the franchise 
requirements imposed on New AC. New AC does not challenge this 
conclusion on appeal and, accordingly, we will affirm the Court's grant 
of summary judgment on Count Three. 
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ADDCA. "The ADDCA is a remedial statute enacted to 
redress the economic imbalance and unequal bargaining 
power between large automobile manufacturers and local 
dealerships, protecting dealers from unfair termination and 
other retaliatory and coercive practices." Northview Motors, 
Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 227 F.3d 78, 92 (3d Cir. 
2000). The substance of the ADDCA cause of action is set 
forth principally in 15 U.S.C. S 1222, which authorizes an 
"automobile dealer" to "bring suit against any automobile 
manufacturer engaged in commerce . . . by reason of the 
failure of said automobile manufacturer . . . to act in good 
faith in performing or complying with any of the terms or 
provisions of the franchise, or in terminating, canceling, or 
not renewing the franchise with said dealer." 15 U.S.C. 
S 1222. Thus, to make out an ADDCA violation, four 
elements must be established: (1) that the plaintiff is an 
automobile dealer; (2) that the defendant is an automobile 
manufacturer engaged in commerce; (3) that there is a 
manufacturer-dealer relationship embodied in a written 
franchise agreement; and (4) that the defendant 
manufacturer failed to act in good faith, thereby injuring 
the plaintiff dealer. See Northview, 227 F.3d at 93. 
 
The first three elements of an ADDCA claim are clearly 
established, and thus the dispositive issue is whether, in 
Count One, New AC sufficiently pleaded GM's failure to act 
in good faith, as that term is understood in the ADDCA 
context. Crucial at this point is the understanding that the 
definition of "good faith" contained in the ADDCA is 
specialized and narrow. An automobile dealer cannot 
establish lack of good faith merely by demonstrating that 
the manufacturer acted arbitrarily, unreasonably, or in a 
generally unfair manner; rather, the dealer must establish 
that the manufacturer's conduct constituted "coercion, 
intimidation, or threats of coercion or intimidation" directed 
at the dealer. 15 U.S.C. S 1221(e).16 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
16. The full text of 28 U.S.C. S 1221(e)'s"good faith" definition is as 
follows: 
 
        The term "good faith" shall mean the duty of each party to any 
       franchise, and all officers, employees, or agents thereof to act in 
a 
       fair and equitable manner toward each other so as to guarantee the 
       one party freedom from coercion, intimidation, or threats of 
coercion 
       or intimidation from the other party: Provided , That 
       recommendation, endorsement, exposition, persuasion, urging or 
       argument shall not be deemed to constitute a lack of good faith. 
 
                                42 
  
The narrowness of this definition is evident not only from 
the statute's plain language, but also from the case law 
construing S 1221(e). See, e.g., Northview, 227 F.3d at 93 
("[I]t is well established that the duty of`good faith' dealing 
imposed by the Act must be given a narrow, rather than 
expansive, construction."). We have expressly stated that 
coercion or intimidation is a necessary element of a cause 
of action under the ADDCA, see id., and also have 
elaborated on the type of conduct that will qualify as 
coercion or intimidation. 
 
We have explained that mere termination of a franchisee 
does not, on its own, constitute an ADDCA violation, nor 
does it afford a presumption that an ADDCA violation has 
occurred. For instance, our decision in Buono Sales, Inc. v. 
Chrysler Motor Corp., 449 F.2d 715 (3d Cir. 1971), made 
clear that "termination [of the franchise] alone will not 
violate the statute." Id. at 724; see also Milos v. Ford Motor 
Co., 317 F.2d 712, 716 (3d Cir. 1963) ("The argument that 
termination before expiration [of the franchise agreement] is 
prima facie evidence of a violation is untenable. The Act 
expressly conditions recovery of damages on a failure of the 
manufacturer to act in good faith. Termination in itself does 
not suffice."). Rather, to state an ADDCA claim, the danger 
of termination "must have previously been used as a threat 
in an attempt to force the dealer to do certain things. 
Examples . . . include a manufacturer's pressure on a 
dealer to accept cars, parts, etc. which the dealer does not 
want or to handle exclusively or sell a quota of parts, 
accessories, etc." Buono Sales, 449 F.2d at 724. 
 
The type of coercion or intimidation rendered actionable 
by the ADDCA occurs only when the automobile 
manufacturer makes a "wrongful demand which will result 
in sanctions if not complied with." Id. at 724 (internal 
quotations and citations omitted); see also Rea v. Ford 
Motor Co., 497 F.2d 577, 585 (3d Cir. 1974) ("[A] violation 
of this Act results if there is a wrongful demand[made] 
which will result in sanctions if not complied with.") 
(internal quotation marks omitted). A demand is wrongful if 
it pressures the dealer into taking an action it would not 
take otherwise, see, e.g., id. at 583, 585 (upholding a jury 
verdict finding Ford in violation of the ADDCA based on 
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Ford's threat to cease shipping Ford vehicles unless the 
dealer resigned its Oldsmobile franchise in a neighboring 
town), or impels the dealer into forfeiting its rights under 
the dealer agreement, see, e.g., Northview, 227 F.3d at 93 
(noting that "a manufacturer's coercion of a dealer into 
relinquishing the right to sell competing car lines may be 
actionable [under the ADDCA], at least if the dealer's 
franchise agreement gives it the right to make such sales"). 
 
A manufacturer does not make a wrongful demand if it 
merely insists that the dealer comply with a reasonable 
obligation imposed by the franchise agreement. For 
instance, in Globe Motors, Inc. v. Studebaker-Packard Corp., 
328 F.2d 645 (3d Cir. 1964), we set aside a jury verdict 
finding that an automobile manufacturer acted in bad faith, 
within the meaning of the ADDCA, by requiring its dealer to 
meet net working capital financial requirements. See id. at 
648. In so doing, we observed that the financial 
requirements, which were expressly set forth in the 
franchise agreement, made clear "that under the contract 
the [manufacturer] had [the] right to insist on the [dealer's] 
compliance with his contractual commitment as to net 
working capital." Id.; see also Milos , 317 F.2d at 717-18 
("An attempt to enforce an unambiguous contractual 
obligation . . . can hardly be said to constitute coercion or 
intimidation."). 
 
This is not to say, however, that a manufacturer who 
chooses to terminate a dealer can immunize itself from 
ADDCA liability by simply pointing to a franchise 
agreement provision with which the dealer ostensibly failed 
to comply and assert that such provision was the basis for 
its severance of the franchise relationship. Even if a 
manufacturer contends that its termination decision was 
motivated by a desire to enforce a reasonable contractual 
provision and that it possessed "objectively valid reasons 
for terminating its relations with a dealer," a franchisee can 
state a claim for relief under the ADDCA by alleging that 
the manufacturer possessed "an ulterior motive for its 
action." Northview, 227 F.3d at 94; cf. Rea, 497 F.2d at 585 
(stating that "[a] manufacturer does not breach its duty to 
act in good faith by terminating a franchise when a dealer 
has failed to fulfill a reasonable obligation or agreement 
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made in connection with the operation of the dealership," 
but stressing that "whether a manufacturer has acted with 
sufficient justification to constitute good faith in bringing 
pressure to bear on a dealer is a factual question the 
determination of which will depend on the circumstances 
arising in each particular case"). That is, a manufacturer's 
insistence that a dealer adhere to its franchise obligations 
can constitute a wrongful, sanction-backed demand (and 
thus the type of coercion or intimidation necessary to state 
an ADDCA violation), if the manufacturer's reliance on 





With this understanding of legal framework governing 
New AC's ADDCA claim in mind, we now turn to New AC's 
specific allegations. Specifically, Count One avers that GM's 
"course of wrongful conduct as set forth in this complaint 
constitutes coercion, intimidation and/or threats of 
coercion or intimidation within the meaning of 15 U.S.C. 
S 1221 et seq., and is in violation ofS 1221 et seq., entitling 
NEW AC to damages." As the language quoted above 
demonstrates, Count One does not identify the precise 
actions on the part of GM that New AC believes violate the 
ADDCA, but it does refer us to the factual allegations 
contained in the previous portions of the counterclaim (and 
expressly incorporates the counterclaim's preceding 
paragraphs by reference). 
 
Examining all of the factual allegations, the District 
Court determined that New AC's ADDCA claim was focused 
on two sets of actions allegedly taken by GM: (1) GM's 1995 
approval of the relocation of the DiFeo Chevrolet dealership 
to a site closer to Route 440, a move that, according to New 
AC, was intended to channel business away from New AC 
and toward DiFeo; and (2) GM's decision to terminate New 
AC based on the latter's decision to add a Volkswagen line 
to its dealership.17 The Court concluded that neither of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
17. On appeal, New AC does not dispute the District Court's decision 
that these two sets of action are the "course of wrongful conduct" alleged 
in Count One of its counterclaim. 
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these alleged actions stated a legal claim for relief under the 
ADDCA. Given our obligation, at the 12(b)(6) stage, to 
construe all allegations and to draw all reasonable factual 
inferences in favor of the non-movant, see Weston, 251 
F.3d at 425, we are constrained to disagree. 
 
With respect to New AC's allegations concerning the 1995 
DiFeo relocation, New AC's core claim appears to be set 
forth in paragraph 93 of its counterclaim, which states: 
 
       [GM] . . . may well have a hidden agenda as[GM's] 
       Project 2000 is implemented which may include the 
       unlawful attempt to force NEW AC out of business by 
       establishing the DiFEO dealership at a site that 
       invades NEW AC's recognized area of focus of sales 
       penetration. Said action directs Chevrolet/Geo 
       business away from NEW AC to DiFEO; injures NEW 
       AC's heretofore existent Chevrolet business so 
       profoundly as to render NEW AC relatively 
       unprofitable. 
 
Paragraph 93 can be fairly read as alleging that GM, 
through the approval of DiFeo's relocation, brought 
pressure to bear on New AC in order to impel New AC to 
forfeit one of the rights to which it is entitled under the 
franchise agreement, i.e., the right to continue as a 
Chevrolet franchisee through the full life of the Dealer 
Agreement, without having its franchise prematurely 
terminated. 
 
Although provisions of the Dealer Agreement do appear to 
confer GM with the authority to make such a dealer 
relocation--for instance, Article 4.3 provides that "the 
relocation of an existing dealer," such as DiFeo, is "within 
the sole discretion" of GM, "pursuant to its business 
judgment"--we have noted above that a manufacturer 
cannot shield itself from ADDCA liability by merely relying 
on an objective provision of a franchise agreement when the 
dealer claims that the manufacturer's reliance on such a 
provision is pretextual. See Northview, 227 F.3d at 94 
(stating that a manufacturer's "objectively valid reasons" for 
a decision will not preclude an ADDCA claim, if the dealer 
can demonstrate that the manufacturer possessed"an 
ulterior motive for its action"). New AC makes just an 
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allegation of pretext in paragraph 93, claiming that GM's 
reason for approving the DiFeo relocation was not 
motivated by a legitimate business goal, but rather was 
part of "Project 2000' "s "hidden agenda." 
 
We reach a similar conclusion with respect to the second 
set of actions alleged to violate the ADDCA, i.e., GM's 
termination of New AC's Chevrolet franchise based on New 
AC's "dualing" of a Volkswagen line. Here, New AC could 
reasonably be characterized as asserting that it was entitled 
to sell a Volkswagen line of vehicles under the terms of the 
Dealer Agreement, and that GM's persistent refusal to 
permit such "dualing" constituted an attempt by GM to 
pressure New AC into forfeiting this entitlement. To be sure, 
as the District Court recognized in its opinion, Article 4.4.2 
unambiguously requires that a franchisee receive prior 
written authorization from GM before adding a vehicle line 
to its dealership, and GM's actions could be characterized 
as a mere attempt to require New AC to comply with its 
reasonable franchise obligations. Again, however, a dealer 
can state an ADDCA claim against a manufacturer, 
notwithstanding the manufacturer's reliance on an 
objectively valid contractual provision, by establishing that 
the manufacturer's motive is a pretextual or bad faith one. 
New AC's complaint in this case, when construed under our 
liberal Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(6) standard, see Weston, 251 
F.3d at 425, can be fairly read as alleging that GM's 
reliance on Article 4.4.2 of the Dealer Agreement was not a 
good-faith business decision, but rather a pretextual 
attempt to have New AC forfeit its right to sell additional 




Although we conclude that the District Court erred in 
dismissing Count One of New AC's counterclaim, we believe 
the Court's error to be harmless, as it did not impact New 
AC's substantial rights. See 28 U.S.C. S 2111 ("On the 
hearing of any appeal . . . in any case, the court shall give 
judgment after an examination of the record without regard 
to errors or defects which do not affect the substantial 
rights of the parties."); Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 61 ("[N]o error or 
defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or omitted 
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by the court . . . is ground for . . . vacating, modifying, or 
otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to 
take such action appears to the court inconsistent with 
substantial justice.").18 We hold a non-constitutional legal 
error harmless if it is highly probable that the error did not 
affect the judgment. See McQueeney v. Wilmington Trust 
Co., 779 F.2d 916, 924-25 (3d Cir. 1985). Thus, in making 
this harmless error determination, we must be well- 
satisfied that the error did not prejudice a party, but we 
need not disprove every reasonable possibility of prejudice. 
See Ballay v. Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc., 925 F.2d 682, 
694 n.15 (3d Cir. 1991); United States v. Jannotti, 729 F.2d 
213, 219-20 & n.2 (3d Cir. 1984). 
 
It is clear that New AC was not prejudiced by the District 
Court's failure to liberally construe Count One of the 
counterclaim. With respect to New AC's claim that GM 
violated the ADDCA when it terminated New AC for 
"dualing" a Volkswagen line, we note that the Court 
permitted Count II of GM's amended complaint to proceed 
to discovery. Count II of the amended complaint, seeking a 
declaration that New AC's termination did not violate the 
ADDCA, is a mirror image of the relevant portion of Count 
One of the counterclaim, and thus necessarily requires an 
adjudication as to whether GM's termination decision 
amounted to coercion and intimidation within the meaning 
of 15 U.S.C. S 1221(e). Count II remained alive through 
discovery, thus affording New AC the opportunity to obtain 
evidence of coercive or intimidating conduct on the part of 
GM in connection with the Chevrolet franchise termination, 
and to have that evidence considered by the District Court.19 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
18. Although Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 61 technically applies only to the district 
courts, see Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 1 ("These rules govern the procedure in the 
United States district courts . . . ."), the Supreme Court has admonished 
the Courts of Appeals to "act in accordance with the salutary policy 
embodied in Rule 61." McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 
U.S. 548, 554 (1984). Moreover, the Supreme Court has observed that 
the federal harmless error statute, 28 U.S.C. S 2111, applies directly to 
the Courts of Appeals, and "incorporates the same principle as that 
found in Rule 61." Id. 
19. In its March 8, 2000 opinion, the District Court in fact granted 
summary judgment in GM's favor on Count II, observing that New AC, 
even after the completion of discovery, failed to furnish any facts 
establishing coercion or intimidation on GM's part. See General Motors 
Corp. v. New A.C. Chevrolet, Inc., 91 F. Supp. 2d 733, 740 (D.N.J. 2000). 
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We reach the same conclusion with respect to New AC's 
claim that an ADDCA violation occurred when GM 
approved the 1995 DiFeo relocation. This ADDCA claim is 
inextricably linked with New AC's "Project 2000" bad faith 
theory. See supra Part II.C (summarizing the"Project 2000" 
theory). Paragraph 93 of the counterclaim, for instance, 
explicitly alleges that the decision to approve DiFeo's 
relocation was made as a result of GM's "Project 2000" 
"hidden agenda." In essence, New AC is contending that 
GM's relocation approval was motivated by a desire to 
constructively or formally terminate New AC as a Chevrolet 
franchisee so as to establish a competing dealership, DiFeo, 
as GM's exclusive Chevrolet dealer in Jersey City, in 
furtherance of a the single-dealer goal embodied in the 
"Project 2000" business strategy. 
 
This close nexus between New AC's "Project 2000" theory 
and its bad faith allegations proves significant to our 
harmless error analysis. Although an erroneous dismissal 
of a claim will ordinarily work a prejudice on the party 
asserting the claim, in that the dismissal will remove the 
claim from the litigation and prohibit the party from 
pursuing discovery with respect to the dismissed claim, the 
factual and procedural circumstances of this case clearly 
indicate that New AC's opportunity to gather evidence 
regarding the "Project 2000" plan was not impeded in any 
respect. The history of the proceedings before the District 
Court demonstrates that New AC has had a full and fair 
opportunity to participate in discovery concerning the 
"Project 2000" theory, and thus had the chance to establish 
a genuine issue as to whether GM did indeed act in bad 
faith in its course of conduct toward New AC. As explained 
at length supra in Part II.C, New AC failed to furnish the 
record evidence necessary to create a genuine issue that 
GM adopted, in bad faith, a strategy designed to eliminate 
New AC's franchise in Jersey City. Thus, even if the 
relocation portion of Count One had remained live in the 
litigation, we are firmly convinced, based on the clear 
record evidence in this case, that New AC would not have 
succeeded in establishing a genuine issue that GM's 
approval of the DiFeo relocation was actuated by a bad- 
faith, "Project 2000" motive. 
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We are thus satisfied that the District Court's legal error 
in construing the allegations made in Count One of the 
counterclaim did not work a prejudice on New AC. 
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court's dismissal of 
Count One. 
 
B. Count Four (Breach of Dealer Agreement)  
 
In Count Four of the counterclaim, New AC alleges, 
rather inartfully, that certain actions taken by GM with 
respect to New AC violated the express and implied terms 
of the Dealer Agreement. The relevant allegations are 
contained in paragraph 116 of the counterclaim, which 
states in full: 
 
        During the ongoing term of the NEW AC franchise, 
       [GM] breached the expressed and implied terms and 
       provisions of those agreements: by relocating/adding a 
       Chevrolet/Geo franchise and thereby establishing a 
       Chevrolet/Geo dealership within an unreasonable 
       geographic and marketing distance from NEW AC; by 
       attempting to interfere with, render impotent and/or 
       otherwise terminate NEW AC's Chevrolet/Geo franchise 
       by destroying the economic viability of same by 
       relocating/adding a Chevrolet/Geo franchise and 
       dealership to a geographic location whereby it will draw 
       and drain significant business away from NEW AC, and 
       by affording and sanctioning DiFEO Chevrolet/Geo's 
       resultant and grossly unfair competitive advantage to 
       the direct disadvantage of and damage to NEW AC; by 
       refusing to comply with its self-imposed mediation 
       process, and by using the unfair competitive advantage 
       of the dualed DiFEO dealership to effect the actual or 
       constructive termination of NEW AC in order to reduce 
       the number of Chevrolet/Geo dealers in the New York 
       New Jersey Metropolitan area in accordance with the 
       dictates of Project 2000 as expressed. 
 
Based on these allegations, New AC presents two 
principal contentions. First, New AC asserts that the 
District Court erred in deciding that Count Four did not 
encompass a claim that GM breached an implied duty of 
good faith and fair dealing by predetermining the outcome 
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of its own management review process. In addition, New AC 
contends that the District Court erroneously concluded that 
an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing did not even 
arise in connection with the provision of the Dealer 
Agreement governing GM's power to authorize and approve 
the relocation of a competing franchisee.20 Before turning to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
20. New AC also argues that the District Court erroneously construed 
Count Four as not encompassing a claim that GM's refusal to permit the 
addition of a Volkswagen line to New AC's dealership breached the 
express terms of the Dealer Agreement. We agree that the Court's 
reading of New AC's complaint was erroneous. To be sure, paragraph 
116 of Count Four of the counterclaim, quoted above, does not reference 
GM's refusal to permit New AC to operate a Volkswagen franchise. 
Nonetheless, a few dozen paragraphs earlier, New AC clearly makes the 
requisite allegation: In paragraph 92, New AC states that GM's "refusal 
to permit NEW AC to establish a Volkswagen franchise. . . is in violation 
of the FRANCHISE [i.e., the terms of the Dealer Agreement]." Although 
New AC's complaint is awkwardly drawn--its breach of contract claim 
based on GM's refusal to allow the "dualing" of a Volkswagen line is not 
included with the general list of contract claims raised in Count Four, 
but rather is set forth in paragraph 92, under the caption "The New AC 
Volkswagen Franchise Acquisition"--given our liberal notice pleading 
regime, see Weston, 251 F.3d at 429-30, we will not hold New AC's 
drafting irregularities against it. 
 
Nonetheless, we will affirm the District Court's dismissal of this 
portion of Count Four, concluding that any error committed by the 
District Court was harmless, as it did not work a prejudice on New AC. 
See supra Part III.A.3. (setting forth the applicable harmless error 
standard). Although the District Court dismissed Count Four of the 
counterclaim, Count I of GM's amended complaint remained alive in the 
litigation. The claim asserted by GM in that count--that GM's 
termination of New AC, on the ground that New AC persisted in 
operating a Volkswagen franchise over GM's objection, was lawful under 
the terms of the Dealer Agreement--fairly encompasses New AC's claim 
that GM's refusal to permit the Volkswagen addition represented a 
breach of the franchise agreement. By adjudicating Count I, the District 
Court would necessarily determine whether GM's objection to the added 
Volkswagen franchise was in accordance with the Dealer Agreement 
between GM and New AC. Because Count I remained active in the 
litigation, proceeded to discovery, and was ultimately adjudicated by the 
District Court, see General Motors Corp., 91 F. Supp. 2d at 738-39, we 
conclude that the District Court's failure to fully apply the liberal 
pleading rules to New AC's claims respecting GM's objection to the 
Volkswagen franchise did not affect New AC's substantial rights, and 
thus amounted to nothing more than harmless error. 
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each of these contentions, we note that the District Court 
decided, and the parties on appeal agree, that Michigan law 
governs the implied covenant of good faith issue. This is 
because of the express choice of law provision contained in 
Article 17.12 of the Dealer Agreement, which states in 
relevant part that "[t]his agreement is governed by the laws 




New AC contends that the District Court erred in 
construing New AC's counterclaim when the Court 
concluded that Count Four did not include a claim for a 
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing based on the fact that GM allegedly predetermined 
the outcome of its management review process. The District 
Court declined to address this breach of contract claim on 
the ground that such a contention appeared nowhere in 
Count Four of the counterclaim. New AC submits that the 
District Court's decision was erroneous, in that the Court 
failed to liberally construe the allegations of New AC's 
counterclaim. We disagree. 
 
The franchise agreement between GM and New AC 
establishes a private mechanism for the resolution of 
disputes between the manufacturer and dealer arising out 
of the respective obligations imposed on them by the 
franchise arrangement. This mechanism is described in a 
document entitled "Dispute Resolution Process for 
Chevrolet, Pontiac, Oldsmobile or GMC Truck Dealers," and 
the basic procedure is summarized in that document's 
foreword. In essence, if a dealer is dissatisfied with one of 
GM's decisions, believing it to be inconsistent with its rights 
under the Dealer Agreement, its first recourse is to seek 
"Division Management Review." 
 
In general, the dealer initiates the "Division Management 
Review" process by sending a letter to GM's General Sales 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
21. New Jersey gives effect to contracting parties' private choice of law 
clauses unless they conflict with New Jersey public policy. See 
Instructional Sys., Inc. v. Computer Curriculum Corp., 614 A.2d 124, 133 
(N.J. 1992). We ascertain no such conflict here. 
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and Service Manager within 60 days of receipt of the 
challenged decision. The letter must clearly request 
management review and state the reasons for the dealer's 
challenge. If the dealer objects to the result of the "Division 
Management Review" process, it can seek binding 
arbitration as an alternative to instituting a legal action, 
but such binding arbitration will occur only if both the 
dealer and GM mutually agree to pursue it. At the same 
time, the administrator of the private dispute resolution 
process can attempt to explore the option of informal, non- 
binding mediation with GM and the dealer. Again, however, 
the dispute will be mediated only upon the dealer's and 
GM's mutual agreement. In considering New AC's 
contention, we assume arguendo that Michigan law would 
impose an obligation on GM to conduct its private dispute 
resolution process in good faith. Nonetheless, examining 
the substance of New AC's counterclaim, it is evident that, 
in its counterclaim, New AC fails to allege the facts 
necessary to show that a breach of such an implied 
covenant occurred. 
 
New AC's counterclaim does reference the Management 
Review process described above in several places, although 
no such allegations appear under the Count Four heading. 
In various paragraphs of its counterclaim, New AC states 
that it sought administrative review of two decisions made 
by GM: GM's 1998 decision to terminate New AC's 
Chevrolet franchise, and its earlier 1996 decision refusing 
to permit the addition of a Volkswagen line to New AC's 
dealership. First, in paragraph 72 of its counterclaim, New 
AC alleges that on January 26, 1998, it requested 
"Management Review of GM's January 5, 1998 termination 
notice." Importantly, New AC does not, however, claim that 
GM's response to this Management Review request was 
improper in any fashion, let alone assert that GM's conduct 
of the review procedure breached an implied covenant of 
good faith. Put simply, with regard to administrative review 
of GM's decision to terminate New AC's Chevrolet franchise, 
New AC's complaint simply alleges that such review was 
sought; it does not claim that GM's handling of the review 
process was wrongful in any respect. Accordingly, we 
cannot say that this allegation suffices for 12(b)(6) purposes 
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to state a claim for a breach of an implied covenant of good 
faith. 
 
New AC does go somewhat further in its allegations 
concerning administrative review of GM's earlier 1996 
decision to refuse New AC's request to add a Volkswagen 
franchise to its dealership. In paragraphs 37 through 43 of 
the counterclaim, New AC alleges that it sought 
Management Review of this refusal, and, in paragraph 47, 
New AC asserts that the Management Review that was 
conducted "did not comport with the purpose, intent and 
spirit of [GM's] mandated dispute resolution process." 
Although this last allegation does maintain that GM's use 
of the Management Review procedure was faulty in some 
abstract sense, New AC fails to allege the reasons why GM's 
internal review was unlawful in general, or in breach of an 
implied covenant of good faith in particular. Moreover, New 
AC's allegations do not establish the factual basis for this 
claim. That is, New AC's counterclaim does not include 
factual allegations demonstrating why the administrative 
review GM conducted in connection with its 1996 refusal of 
the Volkswagen addition did not comply with the purpose 
of the Management Review process. 
 
Perhaps New AC could have alleged that the review 
omitted the steps specified in GM's "Dispute Resolution 
Process" document, or that New AC was denied a 
meaningful opportunity to present its case to the relevant 
decision-makers, but New AC's counterclaim does not 
contain these types of allegations. New AC's minimalist, 
conclusory allegations--amounting, in essence, to nothing 
more than a bare bones claim that GM's decision was 
"wrongful in the air"--do not suffice to cross the 12(b)(6) 
threshold. Cf. 2 James Wm. Moore, Moore's Federal 
Practice S 12.34[1][b], at 12-61 to 12-63 (3d ed. 2001) 
("Liberal construction has its limits, for the pleading must 
at least set forth sufficient information for the court to 
determine whether some recognized legal theory exists on 
which relief could be accorded the pleader. . . .[C]onclusory 
allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual 
conclusions will not suffice to prevent a motion to dismiss. 
While facts must be accepted as alleged, this does not 
automatically extend to bald assertions, subjective 
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characterizations, or legal conclusions.") (internal quotation 
marks, citations, and footnotes omitted). 
 
Finally, New AC also relies on language in paragraph 116 
of Count Four, which states inter alia that GM "breached 
the expressed and implied terms and provisions" of its 
franchise agreement "by refusing to comply with its self- 
imposed mediation process." However, as set forth above in 
our summary of the "Dispute Resolution Process" 
document, such voluntary mediation is initiated only when 
the administrator of the dispute resolution process seeks to 
explore such an option with GM and the dealer, and 
requires the mutual agreement of both GM and the dealer 
before it can be pursued. Canvassing New AC's 
counterclaim, we can find no allegation that either New AC 
or the dispute resolution administrator requested the 
institution of voluntary mediation, or that any such request 
was denied. Thus, New AC's conclusory allegation that GM 
breached an implied covenant of good faith "by refusing to 
comply with its self-imposed mediation process" does not 




New AC also contends that the District Court erred in 
deciding, as a matter of law, that the Dealer Agreement 
provision granting GM the power to approve the relocation 
of competing franchisees did not give rise to an implied 
covenant that GM would make that decision in good faith. 
The District Court offered this construction in connection 
with its dismissal of the portion of Count Four in which 
New AC alleged that GM breached an implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing by approving the 1995 relocation 
of DiFeo Chevrolet, a competing franchisee, to a more 
desirable commercial location, thereby siphoning business 
away from New AC.22 
 
Although Michigan law on the implied covenant of good 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
22. New AC made a virtually identical contention regarding GM's 
approval of the DiFeo relocation in paragraph 93 of Count One of its 
counterclaim, which appeared to allege inter alia that this relocation 
approval violated the ADDCA. See supra Part III.A.2. 
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faith is rather sparse, it can be fairly said that Michigan 
recognizes that such a covenant can arise in certain 
circumstances, depending on the nature of the contractual 
arrangement between the parties. Specifically, two 
principles supply the framework for analyzing whether a 
contractual provision gives rise to an implied covenant of 
good faith. First, under Michigan law, "[w]here a party to a 
contract makes the manner of its performance a matter of 
its own discretion, the law does not hesitate to imply the 
proviso that such discretion be exercised honestly and in 
good faith." Burkhardt v. City Nat'l Bank of Detroit, 226 
N.W.2d 678, 680 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975). At the same time, 
"Michigan law does not imply the good faith covenant where 
parties have `unmistakably expressed' their respective 
rights." Hubbard Chevrolet Co. v. General Motors Corp., 873 




23. In its appellate brief, GM argues that this portion of Count Four of 
the counterclaim does not state a claim for legal relief because Michigan 
law does not recognize an independent cause of action for breach of an 
implied covenant of good faith. This characterization of Michigan law is 
technically correct, as Michigan courts have stated on numerous 
occasions that "Michigan does not recognize an independent tort action 
for an alleged breach of a contract's implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing." Ulrich v. Federal Land Bank of St. Paul, 480 N.W.2d 910, 
911 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991) (per curiam) (emphasis added); see also Kewin 
v. Massachusetts Mut'l Life Ins. Co., 295 N.W.2d 50, 56 (Mich. 1980); 
Dahlman v. Oakland Univ., 432 N.W.2d 304, 306 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988) 
(per curiam). However, we do not believe this settled Michigan rule to be 
applicable to New AC's specific claim. As the allegations set forth in 
paragraph 116 of New AC's counterclaim make clear, see supra Part 
III.B, New AC is not asserting that GM's alleged bad faith breached a 
duty that GM owed to New AC independent of the contractual obligations 
fixed by the Dealer Agreement and is not claiming that such a breach 
should be independently actionable, cf. Kewin , 295 N.W.2d at 56; 
Dahlman, 432 N.W.2d at 306. Rather, fairly read, Count Four of New 
AC's counterclaim alleges that GM's conduct in approving the DiFeo 
relocation breached an implied covenant of good faith emanating from 
the terms of the Dealer Agreement. As noted in the text above, cases 
such as Hubbard and Burkhardt make clear that, under Michigan law, 
such an implied obligation can arise when, for instance, the specific 
contractual terms make a party's performance under the contract 
entirely discretionary. 
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New AC's allegation concerning GM's approval of the 
DiFeo relocation thus required the District Court to 
determine whether the terms of the Dealer Agreement 
regarding GM's approval of competing dealers' relocations 
gave rise, under the framework set forth above, to an 
implied covenant that GM render that decision in good 
faith. The pertinent provision of the Dealer Agreement is 
Article 4.3, captioned "Establishment of Additional 
Dealers," which provides: 
 
        [GM] reserves the right to appoint additional dealers 
       but [GM] will not exercise this right without first 
       analyzing dealer network planning considerations. 
 
        Prior to establishing an additional dealer within 
       Dealer's Area of Primary Responsibility, [GM] will 
       advise Dealer in writing and give Dealer thirty days to 
       present relevant information before [GM] makes a final 
       decision. [GM] will advise Dealer of the final decision, 
       which will be made solely by [GM] pursuant to its 
       business judgment. . . . 
 
        Neither the appointment of a dealer at or within 
       three miles of a former dealership location as a 
       replacement for the former dealer nor the relocation of 
       an existing dealer will be considered the establishment 
       of an additional Dealer for purposes of this [section]. 
       Such events are within the sole discretion of [GM], 




It is difficult (if not impossible) to read Article 4.3 as 
anything other than a provision making the relocation 
decision a matter for GM's own discretion, a provision that, 
under existing Michigan contract law, would give rise to a 
good faith obligation. Article 4.3, by its terms, states that 
the "relocation of an existing dealer"--in this case, the 
moving of DiFeo Chevrolet from its Kennedy Boulevard 
location to a site closer to Route 440--is "within the sole 
discretion of [GM], pursuant to its business judgment." 
Michigan law, through decisions such as Burkhardt, clearly 
teaches that it is these precise situations--situations in 
which one party retains unfettered control over part of its 
performance under a contract--that call most strongly for 
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the application of an implied covenant of good faith. See, 
e.g., Burkhardt, 226 N.W.2d at 680 ("Where a party to a 
contract makes the manner of its performance a matter of 
its own discretion, the law does not hesitate to imply the 
proviso that such discretion be exercised honestly and in 
good faith."); see also Ferrell v. Vic Tanny Int'l, Inc., 357 
N.W.2d 669, 672-73 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984) (per curiam) 
(holding that a health club's authority, under its contract 
with club members, to promulgate rules and regulations 
governing the use of its facilities was sufficiently 
discretionary to give rise to an implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing); cf. Paradata Computer Networks, Inc. 
v. Telebit Corp., 830 F. Supp. 1001, 1006 (E.D. Mich. 1993) 
(observing that "discretion is the hallmark of the covenant" 
of good faith).24 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
24. The District Court reached the opposite conclusion, deciding that 
Article 4.3 of the Dealer Agreement unambiguously expressed the 
obligations of the parties in regard to the DiFeo relocation decision, and 
thus did not yield any implied covenant of good faith. In so doing, the 
Court relied almost exclusively on Hubbard, a case from the Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, applying Michigan law to a dispute between 
an automobile dealer and the vehicle manufacturer concerning the 
relocation of a franchise, a dispute similar to the disagreement between 
GM and New AC in this case over the DiFeo relocation. 
 
In Hubbard, a Chevrolet franchisee sought to move its location to a site 
other than the one specified in its dealership agreement. Much like the 
agreement in this case, the contract in Hubbard  required the franchisee 
to receive prior written approval from GM for any move of the dealership 
premises. See Hubbard, 873 F.2d at 874. GM denied its franchisee's 
request, and the franchisee brought suit alleging inter alia that the 
relocation provision requiring GM's prior written approval carried with it 
an implied covenant that GM's decision would be made in good faith. See 
id. at 875. The Fifth Circuit disagreed, concluding that the relevant 
relocation provision did not give rise to any implied covenant, since it 
unmistakably and fully expressed the respective rights of GM by 
precisely identifying the dealer's original location and "flatly 
preclud[ing] 
relocation absent GM's approval." Id. at 878. The Court stressed that the 
dealer agreement "gave GM the authority to approve or disapprove 
relocation for its own reasons, and thus set out the limits of what the 
contract requires of the parties." Id. 
 
In this case, the District Court concluded that Article 4.3 of the Dealer 
Agreement was analogous to the contractual provision at issue in 
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However, our conclusion that the District Court 
committed error in construing Michigan law does not 
necessitate reversal of this portion of the Court's January 
13, 1999 order, because we consider this error to be 
harmless. See supra Part III.A.3 (setting forth the applicable 
harmless error standard). It is abundantly clear from New 
AC's amended counterclaim, its appellate brief, and its 
contentions at oral argument, that New AC's theory behind 
GM's bad faith is integrally and inextricably linked with the 
manufacturer's "Project 2000" or "Plan 2000" business 
strategy. For instance, paragraph 113 of Count Four of the 
counterclaim expressly states that GM's relocation decision 
was intended "to effect the actual or constructive 
termination of NEW AC in order to reduce the number of 
Chevrolet/Geo dealers in the New York New Jersey 
Metropolitan area in accordance with the dictates of Project 
2000 as expressed." 
 
As we explained supra in Part II.C and again in Part 
III.A.3, New AC has had a full and fair opportunity to 
participate in discovery concerning the "Project 2000" 
theory, in order to establish a genuine issue as to whether 
GM did indeed act in bad faith. Yet, New AC has not 
succeeded in establishing a genuine issue that GM adopted 
a strategy designed to eliminate New AC's franchise in 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Hubbard, in that both clearly conferred manufacturer GM with the 
authority to approve or disapprove the dealership move for its own 
reasons. We believe this conclusion and rationale is at considerable odds 
with the principle of Michigan law stated in Burkhardt, which makes 
clear that an implied covenant of good faith arises precisely in those 
situations "[w]here a party to a contract makes the manner of its 
performance a matter of its own discretion." Burkhardt, 226 N.W.2d at 
680. Most provisions conferring blanket discretion on a decision maker, 
such as the relocation provision in Article 4.3, will give that decision 
maker the power to make the choice for its own reasons; such is the 
nature of the exercise of unfettered discretion. Were we to construe 
Article 4.3's language--which on its face confers unfettered and 
unbounded discretion to GM--as an unmistakable and exhaustive 
expression of the parties' obligations, we would leave few if any 
situations in which the implied covenant of good faith would ever arise. 
We believe such a result would be in significant tension with extant 
Michigan contract law. 
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Jersey City and thus acted in bad faith in its course of 
dealing with New AC. Therefore, even if the District Court's 
interpretation of Michigan contract law had not been in 
error, and New AC's claim concerning the DiFeo relocation 
approval had remained active in the litigation, we are firmly 
convinced, based on the clear record evidence in this case, 
that New AC would not have succeeded in establishing a 
genuine issue that GM's approval of the DiFeo move was 
actuated by a bad-faith, "Project 2000" motive. 
Consequently, we are satisfied that New AC was not 
prejudiced by the District Court's error, and consider such 




In sum, we conclude that none of New AC's challenges 
with respect to the District Court's January 13, 1999 order 
necessitate reversal of that order. Accordingly, the District 




25. In addition to the four principal points discussed in the text above, 
New AC also raises a series of challenges to four other sets of orders, 
and to the District Court's award of attorneys fees in GM's favor. 
Because we find these arguments insubstantial and unpersuasive, we 
deal with them summarily here. 
 
The May 15, 1998 Order 
 
Following the filing of its counterclaim, New AC moved for a 
preliminary injunction blocking GM's scheduled termination of New AC's 
Chevrolet franchise. The District Court denied New AC injunctive relief in 
a May 15, 1998 order. The challenge to this order that New AC raises on 
this appeal presents a straightforward application of the claim preclusion 
doctrine, since the propriety of this preliminary injunction denial has 
already been appealed to this Court by New AC on a prior occasion and 
been resolved against New AC. All of the elements necessary to grant our 
prior order claim preclusive effect are present: The prior order 
represents 
a final adjudication of the question whether New AC was entitled to 
preliminary injunctive relief; that question was litigated before this 
Court 
by the same parties that are before us today; and New AC's current 
appeal raises the exact question that was decided in our prior order. See 
Corestates Bank, N.A. v. Huls America, Inc., 176 F.3d 187, 194 (3d Cir. 
1999) (setting forth the elements of the claim preclusion doctrine). Quite 
 




We affirm the orders of the District Court in all respects. 
 
(Text continued on page 63) 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
clearly, the claim preclusion doctrine does not permit New AC to re-visit 
and re-argue issues already decided by this Court in the same litigation. 
Accordingly, we dismiss the portion of New AC's appeal challenging the 
District Court's May 15, 1998 order. 
 
The August 26, 1998 Order 
 
On June 16, 1998, New AC moved to dismiss GM's declaratory 
judgment action under Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(6). The District Court 
denied New AC's motion in an order entered on August 26, 1998, and 
New AC now challenges that dismissal. Our review of the District Court's 
denial of a motion to dismiss is plenary. We accept all factual 
allegations 
in the complaint as true, and we draw all reasonable inferences in the 
light most favorable to the non-movant. See Weston v. Pennsylvania, 251 
F.3d 420, 425 (3d Cir. 2001). We believe that a mere examination of the 
face of GM's original complaint suffices to establish its legal adequacy 
for 
12(b)(6) purposes, and therefore affirm the District Court's August 26, 
1998 order. 
 
The March 8, 1999 and April 28, 1999 Discovery Orders 
 
New AC also questions the propriety of two orders entered by the 
Magistrate Judge during the course of discovery, on March 8, 1999 and 
April 28, 1999, respectively. According to New AC, as part of the 
discovery conducted on Counts Two and Three of its counterclaim, 
alleging that GM violated the NJFPA by inter alia imposing unreasonable 
standards of performance on New AC in contravention of S 56:10-7(e), 
New AC sought documents from GM regarding GM's dealer network. In 
the March 8, 1999 order, the Magistrate Judge rejected New AC's broad 
request, and instead required GM to furnish only those documents 
related to New AC. On April 28, 1999, the Magistrate Judge denied New 
AC's motion for reconsideration of the March 8, 1999 decision. On 
appeal, New AC contends that this limitation was erroneous, since New 
AC should have been allowed to gather information regarding GM's 
relationships with other franchisees--e.g., the type of performance 
standards imposed on those franchisees--in order to help establish that 
the standards placed on New AC were unreasonable. 
 
Under Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 72(a), once a magistrate judge to whom a 
nondispositive pretrial matter is referred enters a written order, the 
parties have ten days after service of that order within which to serve 
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and file objections, which will be considered by the district court. See 
Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 72(a). The Rule makes clear that, following this ten-day 
period, "a party may not thereafter assign as error a defect in the 
magistrate judge's order to which objection was not timely made." Id.; 
see also Continental Cas. Co. v. Dominick D'Andrea, Inc., 150 F.3d 245, 
252 (3d Cir. 1998). The record contains no indication that New AC 
attempted to file objections to the Magistrate Judge's March 8, 1999 or 
April 28, 1999 decisions with the District Court. Accordingly, New AC 
has waived any challenge it had to these two discovery orders. 
 
The August 4, 1999 Order 
 
New AC also employs the instant appeal to challenge the District 
Court's August 4, 1999 denial of its motion seeking the recusal of the 
District Judge originally assigned to the litigation and the vacatur of 
all 
of the orders entered by that Judge during the course of the litigation. 
In June of 1999, New AC brought this motion seeking the 
disqualification of the Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C.SS 144 and 455. The 
District Court forcefully rejected New AC's motion both on the ground 
that the motion was untimely and that it failed on the merits. We review 
a district court's denial of a motion for recusal for abuse of discretion. 
See Blanche Road Corp. v. Bensalem Township, 57 F.3d 253, 265 (3d 
Cir. 1995). We agree with the District Court that New AC's recusal 
motion fell outside of 28 U.S.C. S 144's 10-day time limit, see 28 U.S.C. 
S 144 (providing that an affidavit setting forth the facts and reasons for 
recusal "shall be filed not less than ten days before the beginning of the 
term at which the proceeding is to be heard, or good cause shall be 
shown for failure to file it within such time"). We also agree that it was 
entirely lacking in merit. We therefore conclude that the Court did not 
abuse its discretion in denying the motion, and affirm the Court's 




In the conclusion of its opening appellate brief, New AC requests that 
we set aside all attorneys fees and costs awarded by the District Court 
to GM in this case. The District Court granted these fees in connection 
with its determination, in its April 5, 2000 order, that New AC knowingly 
infringed GM's trademarks and breached Article 17.5 of the Dealer 
Agreement by continuing to use GM marks even after its termination as 
a Chevrolet franchisee, and in connection with its May 11, 2000 order 
holding New AC in civil contempt for failing to comply with the Court's 
directive to cease the use of GM marks. 
 
We find no basis for vacatur of the District Court's attorneys fees and 
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costs award. New AC has never challenged the Court's grant of summary 
judgment in GM's favor on the trademark infringement claims or on the 
claim that New AC's post-termination use of the marks constituted a 
breach of Article 17.5, and has never argued that the Court's civil 
contempt finding was erroneous. Because our jurisprudence makes clear 
that "[a]n issue is waived unless a party raises it in its opening brief," 
Reform Party of Allegheny County v. Allegheny County Dep't of Elections, 
174 F.3d 305, 316 n.11 (3d Cir. 1999) (citation omitted), and because we 
believe that a mere conclusory request for relief, unaccompanied by any 
proffered basis for the grant of such relief, does not suffice to raise an 
issue, we will deny New AC's request to vacate the District Court's 
attorneys fees and costs award. 
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